2 Maurice E Stucke, ‘Should the Government Prosecute Monopolies?’, U of Illinois L Rev : p 497.
3 Jonathan B. Baker, ‘Taking the Error Out of “Error Cost” Analysis’, 80 Antitrust LJ (2015): pp 1, 14.
4 Wolfgang Kerber, ‘Competition, Innovation and Maintaining Diversity Through Competition Law’, in Josef Drexl et al (eds), Competition Policy and the Economic Approach: Foundations and Limitations (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011), pp 173, 174, 179; Grant Miles et al, ‘Industry Variety and Performance’, 14 Strategic Mgmt J (1993): pp 163, 166–72. Plus, competitors can mutually gain from localized competition, such as knowledge spill-overs, improving the quality of their labour pool, and strengthening their network of suppliers. Kenneth M Davidson, Reality Ignored: How Milton Friedman and Chicago Economics Undermined American Institutions and Endangered the Global Economy (Seattle, WA: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2011), pp 96, 152–3; Michael E Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations (New York: Free Press, 1990), pp 662–9; Michael E Porter, ‘Competition and Antitrust: A Productivity-Based Approach’, in Charles D Weller et al (eds), Unique Value: Competition Based on Innovation Creating Unique Value (Ashland, OH: Innovation Press, 2004), pp 154, 161–5. By analogy, plant species compete for pollinators (bees). But in mutualistic networks, the more plant species that grow in a field, the more pollinators are attracted to the area; so, the different plant species stand to gain more when they coexist. Jordi Bascompte, ‘Disentangling the Web of Life’, 325 Science (2009): pp 416, 418.
8 Ibid, para 6; Morrison v Murray Biscuit Co, 797 F2d 1430, 1437 (US Ct of Apps (7th Cir), 1986) (‘purpose of antitrust law, at least as articulated in the modern cases, is to protect the competitive process’); see also Tal v Hogan, 453 F3d 1244, 1258 (US Ct of Apps (10th Cir), 2006); SCFC ILC, Inc v Visa USA, Inc, 36 F3d 958, 963 (US Ct of Apps (10th Cir), 1994).
9 EC Article 82 Guidelines, above note 5, para 6.
12 United States v Microsoft Corporation, 253 F3d 34, 49 (US Ct of Apps (DC Cir), 2001).
14 Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corp v Comm’n  ECR II-3601 (Ct First Instance), paras 558 and 1061.
17 Chapter 13 of this volume.
19 Facebook 2014 Annual Report, above note 15, p 30.
22 George Black, The Trout Pool Paradox: The American Lives of Three Rivers (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2004), pp 10–11, 91–2.
23 Joseph A Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (3rd edn, New York: Harper, 1950), pp 82–3.
24 Douglass C North, ‘Economic Performance Through Time’, 84 Am Econ Rev (1994): pp 359, 359.
25 François Moreau, ‘The Role of the State in Evolutionary Economics’, 28 Cambridge J Econ (2004): pp 847, 851.
26 Andrew I Gavil and Harry First, The Microsoft Antitrust Cases (Boston, MA: MIT Press, 2014), pp 324–4 (discussing importance of ‘competitive movements’).
27 Tim Wu, The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 2010) .
29 John E Lopatka, ‘United States v IBM: A Monument to Arrogance’, 68 Antitrust LJ (2000): pp 145, 146.
30 R Lougee-Heimer, ‘The Common Optimization INterface for Operations Research: Promoting Open-Source Software in the Operations Research Community’, 47(1) IBM J Research and Development (2003): p 59, citing Thomas J Watson, Jr, Father, Son, and Co: My Life at IBM and Beyond (New York: Bantam, 1990).
31 See Eric Beinhocker, The Origin of Wealth: Evolution, Complexity, and the Radical Remaking of Economics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business Review Press, 2006), pp 326–7; Gary Kildall Special, https://archive.org/details/GaryKild.
34 For example, Coupons.com identified search degradation as a significant risk. Coupons.com Incorporated, Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(D) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2014, p 18 (‘Coupons.com 2014 Annual Report’), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1115128/000156459015001837/coup-10k_20141231.htm; see also Maurice E Stucke and Ariel Ezrachi, ‘When Competition Fails to Optimize Quality: A Look at Search Engines’, 18 Yale J L & Tech (2016): p 70.
37 Ibid, p 6 (‘Extracting value from big data has become a significant source of power for the biggest players in internet markets.’).
38 Google 2014 Annual Report, above note 18, p 22 (far more of Google’s 53,600 full-time employees are involved in research and development (20,832 employees), than in sales and marketing (17,621), general and administrative (7,510), or operations (7,637)).
39 EC Article 82 Guidelines, above note 5, para 20 (noting incentive ‘to “tip” a market characterised by network effects in its favour or to further entrench its position on such a market’).
40 United States v Aluminum Co of Am, 148 F2d 416, 422 (US Ct of Apps (2d Cir), 1945).
41 These restrictive covenants and certain other practices were not the subject of the 1945 case, but a 1912 DOJ antitrust action. Ibid.
42 EC Article 82 Guidelines, above note 5, para 32 n 4.
44 Publicis/Omnicom (Case Comp/M.7023), Commission Decision C(2014) 89 final, 9 January 2014, para 625. A majority of competitors responded that if the merged entity developed its own big data analytics platform and did not allow access to it, ‘the impact will be limited as they are currently using their own data analytics platform or one from third parties’. Ibid, para 629.
45 McWane, Inc v FTC, 783 F3d 838 (US Ct of Apps (11th Cir), 2015), citing FTC findings; see also LePage’s Inc v 3M, 324 F3d 141, 159 (US Ct of Apps (3rd Cir), 2003) (‘inquiry in Microsoft was whether the monopolist’s conduct excluded a competitor (Netscape) from the essential facilities that would permit it to achieve the efficiencies of scale necessary to threaten the monopoly’).
46 Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money and Information (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), p 67.
47 CMA Report, above note 33, para 17 (noting that ‘[t]he ability and incentives to exclude competitors by denying access to data, and/or the barriers to entry arising from consumer data, will be stronger where the data is a significant input into the quality or other attributes of a product or service’ and the concerns related to possible leverage of market power ‘where consumer data obtained in one market is a significant input to products and services produced in a related but separate market’). A number of respondents highlighted market power as a potential concern, ‘noting that a firm might be able to foreclose rivals by cutting off access to vital data’. Ibid, para 3.57.
49 Ibid, pp 94, 96, 98, 100, 102, 104.
50 Microsoft/Yahoo! Search Business (Case Comp/M.5727), Commission Decision C(2010) 1077, 18 February 2010, para 50.
51 FTC Staff Report, above note 48, p 104.
53 FTC Staff Report, above note 48, p 108.
55 Microsoft/Yahoo! Search, above note 50, para 246.
57 The data in question involved the ‘point de comptage and d’estimation’ [metering and estimating point], ‘consommations annuelles de référence’ [annual reference consumption], consumption profiles, surnames and first names of customers, billing addresses and landline telephone numbers. Ibid.
62 See, eg, EC Article 82 Guidelines, above note 5, para 17; Eastman Kodak Co v Image Tech Servs, Inc, 504 US 451, 476, 112 S Ct 2072, 2087 (1992).
63 Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corp v Commission  ECR II-03601, para 650 (noting the ‘lack of interoperability that competing work group server operating system products [could] achieve with the Windows domain architecture’ that caused an increasing number of consumers to be locked into a homogeneous Windows solution at the level of work group server operating systems’).
64 Facebook/WhatsApp (Case Comp/M.7217), Commission Decision C(2014) 7239 final, 3 October 2014, para 134.
66 OECD, Exploring the Economics of Personal Data, above note 65, p 15.
67 Ibid, p 15 (noting that ‘Google was the biggest recipient of data from smart phone apps in test run by the Wall Street Journal’; that ‘Google’s AdMob, AdSense, Analytics and DoubleClick units received information from 38 of the 101 apps tested’; and that Google’s main mobile advertising network, AdMob, ‘lets advertisers target phone users by location, type of device and demographic data, including gender or age group’).
68 See, eg, Public Citizen, Mission Creep-y: Google Is Quietly Becoming One of the Nation’s Most Powerful Political Forces While Expanding Its Information-Collection Empire, November 2014, p 23, https://www.citizen.org/documents/Google-Political-Spending-Mission-Creepy.pdf:
In the transition to Hangouts, Google made it harder for users to disable all chat histories from being recorded by Gmail. It also removed the ability of people to chat with others using different instant message services than Hangouts, or hosting their own chat servers. Unlike before, people chatting through Google can now only chat with others if the others are chatting through Google, creating pressure for users of online chat programs to join the Google universe. Privacy experts say this is bad for users who want to be able to use chat programs that have better privacy protections and still be able to chat with others using Google’s chat services.
69 The frenemy relationship is discussed in Ariel Ezrachi and Maurice E Stucke, Virtual Competition: The Promise and Perils of the Algorithm-Driven Economy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, forthcoming 2016).
72 Facebook/WhatsApp, above note 64, para 134.
73 Facebook 2014 Annual Report, above note 15, p 11.
74 Coupons.com 2014 Annual Report, above note 34, pp 15, 17; Twitter Inc, Quarterly Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(D) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2015, p 44 (‘Twitter June 2015 Quarterly Report’), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1418091/000156459015006705/twtr-10q_20150630.htm; LinkedIn Corporation, Quarterly Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(D) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2015, p 47 (‘LinkedIn June 2015 Quarterly Report’), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1271024/000127102415000020/a20150630-10qdocument.htm; Yelp Inc, Quarterly Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(D) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2015, p 33 (‘Yelp June 2015 Quarterly Report’), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1345016/000120677415002479/yelp_10q.htm.
75 Coupons.com 2014 Annual Report, above note 34, p 17; Yelp June 2015 Quarterly Report, above note 74, p 33; LinkedIn June 2015 Quarterly Report, above note 74, p 47.
76 Facebook 2014 Annual Report, above note 15, p 11; Twitter June 2015 Quarterly Report, above note 74, p 44.
77 Facebook 2014 Annual Report, above note 15, p 11.
78 Facebook 2012 Annual Report, above note 35, p 15.
79 See, eg, Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, In re Intel Corporation, FTC Docket No 9341, 4 August 2010, p 5, https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2010/08/100804intelanal_0.pdf (noting how Intel effectively slowed the performance of software written using Intel’s compilers on computers with competing central processing units, and to the ‘unknowing public, OEMs [original equipment manufacturers], and software vendors, the slower performance of non-Intel-based computers when running certain software applications was mistakenly attributed to the performance of non-Intel CPUs’).
81 comScore, above note 80, pp 20, 55 (finding that 21% of US smartphone users have not changed their home screen, and app usage is ‘reflexive, habitual behavior, where those occupying the best home screen real estate are used most frequently’).
85 Kristen Scholer, ‘Bankrate Is Hit by Anxiety on Google’, Wall Street Journal, 26 February 2016, p C4. The company went public in 2011.
86 Bankrate Form 8-K, above note 83, p 5.
87 Scholer, above note 85, p C4.
88 United States v Microsoft Corporation, above note 12, p 64.
90 Dennis W Carlton, ‘A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal to Deal—Why Aspen and Kodak are Misguided’, NBER Working Paper No w8105, February 2001, http://ssrn.com/abstract=258504.
92 Lorain Journal Co v United States, 342 US 143, 72 S Ct 181 (1951).
93 Carlton, above note 90, p 28.
95 European Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission Opens Formal Investigation Against Google in Relation to Android Mobile Operating System’, Press Release, 15 April 2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-4782_en.htm. Others have stated that Google has more and more applications for its Android system, ‘which are the lifeblood of any mobile operating system, under its closed source control’. Shane McGlaun, ‘Google Seeks to Control Android by Making More Apps Closed Source’, Slash Gear, 21 October 2013, http://www.slashgear.com/google-seeks-to-control-android-by-making-more-apps-closed-source-21302205/. In particular, the claim is that Google’s ‘real power in mobile comes from control of the Google apps—mainly Gmail, Maps, Google Now, Hangouts, YouTube, and the Play Store’, which phone manufacturers must license from Google: ‘It is at this point that you start picturing a scene out of The Godfather, because these apps aren’t going to come without some requirements attached.’ Ron Amadeo, ‘Google’s Iron Grip on Android: Controlling Open Source by Any Means Necessary: Android is Open—Except for All the Good Parts’, Ars Technica, 20 October 2013, http://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2013/10/googles-iron-grip-on-android-controlling-open-source-by-any-means-necessary/3/. The complaint is that Google requires any licensee who wants Gmail and Maps, to also license ‘Google Play Services, Google+, and whatever else Google feels like adding to the package’. Ibid.
96 European Commission, ‘Commission Opens Formal Investigation Against Google’, above note 95.
100 DOJ, Antitrust Division, Workload Statistics: FY 1980–1989, http://www.justice.gov/atr/division-operations; DOJ, Antitrust Division, Workload Statistics: FY 1990–1999, http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2009/06/09/246419.pdf; DOJ, Antitrust Division, Workload Statistics: FY 2000–2009, http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2012/04/04/281484.pdf; DOJ, Antitrust Division, Workload Statistics: FY 2005–2014, http://www.justice.gov/atr/antitrust-division-workload-statistics-fy-2005-2014.
101 DOJ, Workload Statistics: FY 2005–2014, above note 100.
104 See United States v Braniff Airways, Inc, 453 F Supp 725 (US Dist Ct (WD Tex), 1978).
106 Albert A Foer (ed), The Next Antitrust Agenda: The American Antitrust Institute’s Transition Report on Competition Policy to the 44th President of the United States (Lake Mary, FL: Vandeplas Publishing, 2008), p 234.