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View translated passages only
Oxford Law Citator
Contents
Expand All
Collapse All
Preliminary Material
Dedication
Table of Contents
Table of Cases
European Union
Germany
United Kingdom
United States
Table of Legislation
European Union
United States
Main Text
Part I Introduction and Recent Developments
1 Antitrust and Patent Law
I Introduction
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
II Issues at the Patent–Competition Law Intersection
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
III Scrutinizing Patentee Conduct: An Antitrust Challenge
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
1.23
1.24
1.25
1.26
1.27
1.28
1.29
1.30
1.31
1.32
IV A Roadmap for the Book
1.33
A Part II
1.34
1.35
B Part III
1.36
C Part IV
1.37
1.38
1.39
D Part V
1.40
1.41
1.42
1.43
E Part VI
1.44
1.45
1.46
2 Important Developments in Antitrust–Patent Law
I Introduction
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
II Actavis Rewrites US Antitrust and Patent Law
2.5
2.6
2.7
2.8
A Background
2.9
2.10
B The Supreme Court speaks in Actavis
2.11
2.12
2.13
2.14
2.15
C Why do reverse payments less than litigation costs pass muster?
2.16
2.17
2.18
2.19
2.20
2.21
D The larger impact of Actavis on antitrust–patent cases
2.22
a The theory of Actavis
2.23
2.24
2.25
2.26
2.27
b The potential impact of Actavis beyond pay-for-delay settlements
2.28
(a) Licensing restraints
2.29
2.30
2.31
2.32
2.33
(i) Licensing restraints that facilitate settlement
2.34
2.35
2.36
2.37
2.38
2.39
2.40
2.41
2.42
2.43
2.44
2.45
(ii) Patent-licensing deals not arising through litigation
2.46
2.47
2.48
2.49
2.50
2.51
2.52
2.53
2.54
(iii) Agreeing not to challenge patent validity
2.55
2.56
(iv) Could Actavis bolster suspect restraints?
2.57
2.58
(b) Standard-essential patents
2.59
2.60
2.61
2.62
2.63
(c) Patent-assertion entities
2.64
2.65
2.66
2.67
2.68
E Conclusion
2.69
III EU Law on Reverse Payments
2.70
2.71
A The Commission clamps down on pay-for-delay agreements
2.72
2.73
2.74
B A transatlantic rift?
2.75
2.76
2.77
2.78
2.79
2.80
2.81
2.82
2.83
2.84
IV The CJEU Limits Strategic Manipulation of the Patent System in AstraZeneca , but Retreats from an Effects-based Approach
2.85
2.86
2.87
2.88
2.89
2.90
2.91
2.92
2.93
2.94
2.95
2.96
2.97
2.98
2.99
V The CJEU Reigns in ‘By-object’ Analysis in Cartes Bancaires
A Overview: the use and abuse of by-object scrutiny
2.100
2.101
2.102
2.103
2.104
2.105
2.106
B The CJEU limits by-object analysis
2.107
2.108
2.109
2.110
2.111
2.112
2.113
2.114
VI The Strategic Use of Standard-Essential Patents
2.115
2.116
2.117
VII Antitrust Issues Surrounding Patent-Assertion Entities
2.118
2.119
2.120
2.121
2.122
2.123
2.124
2.125
Part II The Patent and Antitrust Laws of Europe and America
3 The Patent Crisis and its Antitrust Implications
I Introduction
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7
3.8
3.9
3.10
3.11
3.12
3.13
II The Patent System’s Economic Function
A The classic ‘incentive to invent’ rationale for the patent regime
3.14
3.15
3.16
3.17
B Challenges facing the patent system
3.18
3.19
3.20
3.21
3.22
3.23
3.24
3.25
3.26
C Empirical evidence of the effect of the patent system
3.27
3.28
3.29
3.30
3.31
3.32
3.33
3.34
3.35
3.36
3.37
3.38
3.39
3.40
3.41
3.42
III The US Patent System
3.43
A The core patent right
3.44
3.45
3.46
3.47
B The overriding importance of a patent’s claims
3.48
3.49
3.50
3.51
C The conditions of patentability and the weak-patent problem
3.52
3.53
3.54
3.55
3.56
D Patent litigation in the United States
3.57
a The nature of US patent litigation
3.58
3.59
3.60
3.61
3.62
3.63
3.64
3.65
b The ex post patent-licensing market and the rise of PAEs
3.66
3.67
3.68
3.69
E Patent-assertion entities abuse the patent system
3.70
a PAEs and ex post patent licensing
3.71
3.72
3.73
3.74
b PAEs come in two forms
3.75
3.76
3.77
c Why ex post patent aggregation and assertion harm society
3.78
3.79
3.80
3.81
3.82
3.83
3.84
F Executive and legislative action to limit abuse of the patent regime
3.85
3.86
3.87
3.88
G Judicial steps to recalibrate the patent system
3.89
3.90
3.91
3.92
3.93
3.94
3.95
3.96
IV Patent Law in Europe
A Introduction
3.97
3.98
3.99
3.100
3.101
B Patent law under the European Patent Convention
3.102
3.103
3.104
3.105
3.106
3.107
3.108
a Claim construction under English and Welsh law
3.109
3.110
3.111
b Claim construction under German law
3.112
3.113
3.114
3.115
C The litigation process in England and Wales and in Germany
3.116
a Patent litigation in Germany
3.117
3.118
3.119
3.120
3.121
3.122
b Patent litigation in England and Wales
3.123
3.124
3.125
3.126
D Will the PAE problem afflict the Unified Patent Court?
3.127
3.128
V Conclusion: How the Patent Crisis Implicates Competition Policy
3.129
4 How the EU and US Antitrust Regimes Differ
I Introduction
4.1
4.2
4.3
II The Different Traits, Goals, and Policies of EU and US Antitrust Law
4.4
A Competing narratives on the meaning of consumer welfare
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8
B The European pursuit of integration
4.9
C Distinct roles for economic analysis
4.10
4.11
4.12
4.13
4.14
4.15
4.16
4.17
4.18
D Sociopolitical views on dominant firms
4.19
4.20
4.21
E Administrative design
4.22
4.23
4.24
4.25
III How EU and US Competition Laws Diverge
A Asymmetric spheres of coverage
4.26
4.27
4.28
B Vertical restraints
4.29
C Dominance
4.30
4.31
4.32
4.33
D Predatory pricing
4.34
4.35
4.36
E Product tying
4.37
4.38
4.39
4.40
F Refusals to deal
4.41
4.42
4.43
4.44
4.45
G Bundled and loyalty discounts
4.46
4.47
4.48
4.49
4.50
4.51
4.52
4.53
4.54
H Conclusion
4.55
IV Firms Enjoy Less Procedural Protections in Europe
4.56
4.57
4.58
4.59
4.60
4.61
4.62
4.63
4.64
4.65
4.66
4.67
4.68
4.69
4.70
Part III Understanding the Patent–Competition Law Interface
5 The Relationship between Patent and Antitrust Law
I Introduction
5.1
5.2
5.3
II Evolving Views of the Patent–Competition Law Intersection
5.4
5.5
5.6
5.7
5.8
5.9
5.10
5.11
5.12
5.13
5.14
III The Scope-of-the-Patent Theory Takes Hold
A The traditional view: antitrust cabins monopoly to a patent’s claims
5.15
5.16
5.17
5.18
5.19
5.20
5.21
5.22
5.23
5.24
5.25
5.26
5.27
5.28
5.29
B EU law evolves from an existence–exercise distinction to a scope account of the competition–patent interface
5.30
a EU law polices the exercise, but not the existence, of patents
5.31
5.32
5.33
5.34
5.35
5.36
5.37
5.38
5.39
5.40
5.41
5.42
b The Patent–Scope Concept Emerges in Europe
5.43
5.44
5.45
5.46
5.47
5.48
5.49
5.50
c The existence–exercise distinction erodes
(a) Duties to license and the sanctity of patent scope
5.51
5.52
(b) Magill introduces a limited duty to license
5.53
5.54
5.55
5.56
5.57
5.58
(c) The CJEU expands the duty to deal after Magill
5.59
5.60
5.61
5.62
5.63
5.64
(d) Microsoft
5.65
5.66
5.67
5.68
5.69
5.70
5.71
5.72
5.73
5.74
5.75
5.76
5.77
5.78
5.79
C The ‘scope’ account is alluringly simple
5.80
5.81
5.82
5.83
5.84
5.85
5.86
5.87
5.88
5.89
5.90
IV Dissecting the Antitrust–IP Interface and the Scope-of-the-Patent Test
5.91
A ‘Patent scope’ sometimes identifies actionable anticompetitive conduct
5.92
5.93
5.94
5.95
5.96
5.97
B Patents and baseball bats: the limits of a scope theory?
5.98
5.99
5.100
a Acquiring substitute patents
5.101
5.102
5.103
5.104
5.105
5.106
5.107
b Unilateral patent acquisition to exclude competitors
5.108
5.109
5.110
5.111
5.112
c Conspiring to assert patents against mutual competitors
5.113
5.114
5.115
5.116
d Using standard-essential patents to hold-up rivals
5.117
5.118
5.119
5.120
5.121
e Pay-for-delay agreements , Actavis, and the death knell for the scope-of-the-patent test
5.122
5.123
5.124
V Conclusion: Rethinking the Patent–Antitrust Relationship
5.125
5.126
5.127
5.128
5.129
5.130
5.131
5.132
5.133
Part IV Special Issues in Technology Markets
6 Market Definition, Monopoly Power, and Patented Technology
I Introduction
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
A The role of market definition
6.5
6.6
6.7
6.8
6.9
B Unique market-definition challenges in the technology sphere
6.10
6.11
6.12
6.13
6.14
6.15
6.16
6.17
6.18
6.19
6.20
6.21
II Market Definition under US Law
6.22
A Basic rules for defining the relevant product market
6.23
a Reasonable interchangeability of use
6.24
6.25
6.26
b Cross-price elasticity of demand
6.27
6.28
6.29
6.30
c Reconciling the two prongs of market definition
6.31
6.32
6.33
6.34
6.35
B Recurring Problems in Market Definition
6.36
a Heterogeneous products can lie in the same market
6.37
6.38
b Can fungible goods ever lie in different markets?
6.39
6.40
6.41
6.42
6.43
6.44
6.45
6.46
6.47
C Single-brand product markets
6.48
a Overview
6.49
6.50
6.51
6.52
6.53
b US law on single-brand markets
6.54
6.55
6.56
6.57
c Cluster markets
6.58
6.59
6.60
6.61
D Geographic market definition
6.62
6.63
E Idiosyncratic rules governing market definition
a Supply-side substitution as a component of market definition
6.64
6.65
b Bypassing market definition with direct evidence of monopoly power
6.66
6.67
c Market definition as a pleading barrier
6.68
6.69
III The Relevant Market under EU Law
A Introduction
6.70
6.71
6.72
6.73
6.74
6.75
6.76
B The basic rules of market definition in EU law
6.77
a Demand-side substitution
6.78
6.79
6.80
6.81
6.82
6.83
6.84
b Supply-side substitution
6.85
6.86
c Potential competition
6.87
d Geographic market
6.88
6.89
6.90
C Single-brand markets in EU competition law
6.91
6.92
6.93
6.94
6.95
IV Patented Technology and Market Definition
6.96
A US law
a Upstream technology markets
6.97
6.98
6.99
6.100
6.101
6.102
6.103
(a) Single-patent markets
6.104
6.105
6.106
6.107
(b) Market definition and standard-essential patents
6.108
6.109
6.110
6.111
6.112
6.113
6.114
6.115
6.116
(c) Patent portfolios as relevant markets
6.117
6.118
6.119
6.120
6.121
(d) Can a market for invalid patents exist?
6.122
6.123
6.124
(e) Supply-side substitution matters in technology markets
6.125
6.126
6.127
6.128
6.129
6.130
b Patented technology in downstream product markets
6.131
6.132
6.133
6.134
B EU law
6.135
6.136
a Upstream technology markets
6.137
(a) Single-patent technology markets
(i) General principles
6.138
6.139
6.140
6.141
6.142
(ii) Lock-in
6.143
6.144
6.145
(iii) Technology markets in the presence of uncertain patent validity and infringement
6.146
6.147
6.148
6.149
(a) The relationship between upstream technology and downstream product markets
6.150
6.151
6.152
b Patented technology in downstream product markets
6.153
6.154
V Market Power under US and EU Law
6.155
6.156
6.157
a Market power in US antitrust law
6.158
6.159
6.160
6.161
6.162
6.163
6.164
6.165
b Market power in EU competition law
6.166
6.167
6.168
6.169
6.170
6.171
VI When Does a Patent Lawfully Subsume Monopoly Power?
6.172
6.173
6.174
6.175
7 Antitrust Issues Surrounding Open and Closed Systems
I Overview
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
7.8
7.9
7.10
II When Should Antitrust Open Up Closed Networks?
7.11
7.12
A Closed systems usually pose no antitrust problem
7.13
7.14
7.15
7.16
7.17
B Closed systems are presumptively procompetitive
7.18
7.19
7.20
7.21
7.22
7.23
7.24
7.25
7.26
7.27
7.28
7.29
7.30
7.31
III US Law Requires a Firm to Open a System Only in Exceptional Cases
A Introduction
7.32
7.33
7.34
7.35
7.36
7.37
7.38
B Unilaterally closing an open system can invite antitrust scrutiny
7.39
a Early jurisprudence recognized a broad duty to deal
7.40
7.41
7.42
7.43
7.44
b The modern era rejects mandatory sharing in all but outlier cases
7.45
7.46
7.47
7.48
7.49
7.50
7.51
7.52
C Antitrust and open and closed systems: three applications
7.53
a Predatory innovation
7.54
(a) The fact of improvement controls
7.55
(b) Consumers decide
7.56
7.57
7.58
(c) The burden-shifting approach
7.59
7.60
7.61
(d) Modifying a product with the intent to exclude competition might be illegal
7.62
b Essential facilities
7.63
7.64
c Refusal to license patent rights
7.65
7.66
d Technology joint ventures
7.67
7.68
7.69
IV EU Law Requires Dominant Firms to Open a System When Viable Competition Requires It
7.70
7.71
7.72
7.73
7.74
7.75
7.76
7.77
7.78
7.79
7.80
8 The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
I Introduction
8.1
A Why Noerr matters, but is conceptually elusive
8.2
8.3
8.4
B Noerr-Pennington , in brief
8.5
8.6
8.7
II Noerr-Pennington Immunity Before the Supreme Court
8.8
A Background
8.9
B The Noerr-Pennington doctrine emerges
8.10
8.11
8.12
8.13
8.14
8.15
C Noerr does not protect fraudulently procured patents
8.16
8.17
D Trucking Unlimited and serial litigation
8.18
8.19
8.20
8.21
8.22
8.23
E Private market conduct does not implicate Noerr
8.24
8.25
a Allied Tube: Noerr does not immunize conspiracies within private standard-setting organizations
8.26
8.27
8.28
8.29
8.30
8.31
8.32
8.33
8.34
b Trial Lawyers Association
8.35
8.36
8.37
8.38
8.39
c City of Columbia:
8.40
8.41
8.42
F The PREI decision
8.43
8.44
8.45
III The Lower Courts Shape Noerr-Pennington
8.46
A Noerr at the Federal Circuit
8.47
a Federal Circuit law generally governs a patentee’s Noerr immunity
8.48
8.49
8.50
8.51
8.52
b An overview of Federal Circuit law on patentees’ Noerr immunity
8.53
8.54
8.55
8.56
8.57
8.58
8.59
8.60
8.61
B Sham serial litigation: does PREI or Trucking Unlimited control?
8.62
8.63
a The Ninth Circuit Leads the Way in USS–POSCO
8.64
8.65
8.66
b The Second Circuit follows suit
8.67
8.68
c The Fourth Circuit holds that Trucking Unlimited survives PREI
8.69
8.70
d How many lawsuits constitute a ‘whole series’ sufficient to trigger Trucking Unlimited?
8.71
8.72
e What success rate immunizes serial litigation as a matter of law?
8.73
8.74
8.75
8.76
8.77
8.78
C Litigation as part of an overall scheme to violate the antitrust laws
8.79
8.80
a Litigation does not immunize independent antitrust violations
8.81
8.82
8.83
b The Kobe line of cases recognizes antitrust liability for non-sham patent litigation filed pursuant to an overall scheme to monopolize
8.84
8.85
8.86
8.87
8.88
8.89
8.90
c The Second Circuit bars recovery for litigation costs
8.91
8.92
d The Federal Circuit has alluded to ‘overall scheme’ liability for non-sham patent litigation only in dicta
8.93
8.94
e Recent district court opinions point in opposing directions
8.95
8.96
8.97
8.98
8.99
f Litigation and the antitrust-injury problem
8.100
8.101
8.102
8.103
8.104
8.105
D Proving objective baselessness under PREI
8.106
8.107
8.108
8.109
8.110
8.111
8.112
E The weight of law applies Noerr to threatened litigation
8.113
8.114
8.115
F Does Noerr reach lawsuits filed against non-competitors?
8.116
8.117
8.118
G Anticompetitive patent acquisitions and Noerr-Pennington immunity
8.119
8.120
8.121
8.122
H Misrepresentations and immunity under Noerr
8.123
I An antitrust plaintiff must still prove a substantive violation
8.124
8.125
IV Antitrust Immunity for Filing Suit in Europe
8.126
8.127
8.128
8.129
8.130
8.131
8.132
8.133
Part V Patent Hold-Up and Misuse
9 Manipulation of the Standard-Setting Process
I Introduction
9.1
9.2
9.3
9.4
9.5
9.6
9.7
9.8
II Standard-Setting Hold-Up
A The smartphone wars and SEP assertion
9.9
9.10
9.11
9.12
9.13
9.14
9.15
9.16
9.17
9.18
9.19
9.20
9.21
B Sources of antitrust law on SEP hold-up
9.22
a Transatlantic investigations of Samsung
9.23
9.24
b Motorola and Google come under the microscope
9.25
9.26
9.27
C Difficult antitrust questions involving SEP hold-up
9.28
a SEPs and market definition
9.29
9.30
9.31
9.32
9.33
9.34
9.35
b When do SEPs bestow monopoly power?
9.36
9.37
9.38
9.39
9.40
9.41
9.42
9.43
c SEPs and harm to competition
9.44
9.45
d Litigation immunity and SEP assertion
9.46
III US Antitrust Limits on SEPs
9.47
A Nondisclosure of SEPs and violations of FRAND obligations
9.48
a Broadcom v. Qualcomm
9.49
b Rambus v. FTC
9.50
9.51
9.52
9.53
c District courts require strong showings of anticompetitive harm
9.54
9.55
9.56
9.57
9.58
9.59
B Privateering: a new antitrust challenge
9.60
9.61
9.62
9.63
9.64
C Noerr-Pennington immunity in the standard-setting arena
9.65
9.66
9.67
9.68
D Antitrust limits on seeking injunctions using SEPs
9.69
9.70
9.71
9.72
9.73
E Defining FRAND
9.74
(a) FRAND royalties are what the SEP owner and SSO would have agreed upon ex ante
9.75
9.76
9.77
(b) Microsoft v. Motorola
9.78
9.79
9.80
9.81
(i) H.264 Standard
9.82
9.83
9.84
(ii) 802.11 Standard
9.85
(iii) Elusive benchmarks
9.86
(c) The Federal Circuit’s take in D-Link
9.87
9.88
9.89
9.90
IV Antitrust Limits on SEP Assertion in the European Union
9.91
A The CJEU weighs in on SEPs in Huawei v. ZTE
9.92
9.93
9.94
9.95
B The Commission provides guidance in Samsung, Motorola , and Rambus
9.96
9.97
9.98
9.99
9.100
9.101
9.102
9.103
9.104
9.105
9.106
9.107
9.108
9.109
9.110
9.111
V Conclusion
9.112
9.113
9.114
9.115
9.116
9.117
9.118
9.119
10 Targeted Patent Aggregation
I Introduction
10.1
10.2
10.3
10.4
10.5
10.6
10.7
10.8
10.9
10.10
10.11
10.12
10.13
10.14
10.15
10.16
II Anticompetitive Patent Acquisitions by Operating Companies
A The timing of a patent acquisition as an antitrust issue
10.17
10.18
10.19
10.20
10.21
10.22
B The economics of targeted patent aggregation
10.23
a Acquiring substitute patents can monopolize upstream and downstream markets
10.24
b The difficult case of aggregating complementary patents
10.25
10.26
10.27
10.28
(a) Complementary patent acquisitions as a tool to monopolize downstream product markets
10.29
(b) Can aggregating complementary patents create an upstream monopoly?
10.30
10.31
10.32
10.33
10.34
10.35
10.36
10.37
10.38
10.39
10.40
10.41
C Case law reflects the ex ante / ex post distinction
10.42
a SCM v. Xerox: no violation for ex ante patent acquisitions
10.43
10.44
10.45
10.46
10.47
10.48
10.49
10.50
10.51
10.52
b Kobe v. Dempsey Pump: monopolization through patent acquisition
10.53
10.54
10.55
10.56
10.57
D Conclusion
10.58
10.59
III Patent Aggregation by Patent-Assertion Entities
A Overview
10.60
10.61
10.62
10.63
10.64
B Antitrust limits on PAE patent acquisitions: theory
10.65
10.66
10.67
10.68
10.69
10.70
10.71
10.72
10.73
10.74
10.75
10.76
10.77
10.78
10.79
10.80
10.81
C US case law on antitrust limits on PAE patent acquisitions
10.82
10.83
a The ‘rocket docket’ dismisses antitrust claims against a PAE
10.84
10.85
10.86
10.87
10.88
10.89
10.90
b The District of Delaware orders discovery on a PAE’s patent acquisitions
10.91
10.92
10.93
c The District of Maryland finds antitrust claims against a PAE to be plausible
10.94
10.95
10.96
10.97
d Antitrust and PAEs: where from here?
10.98
IV Patent Acquisitions under EU Competition Law
10.99
10.100
A Principles of EU law applicable to patent acquisitions
10.101
a Article 102 TFEU
10.102
10.103
10.104
10.105
b Article 101 TFEU:
10.106
10.107
10.108
10.109
c The Merger Regulation:
10.110
10.111
10.112
10.113
B Patent acquisitions by dominant firms to exclude competition
10.114
10.115
10.116
10.117
10.118
10.119
C Ex ante patent acquisitions would not violate competition law
10.120
10.121
10.122
D Organic and submarine patenting to exclude competition
10.123
10.124
10.125
10.126
E Patent aggregation by non-practising entities
10.127
10.128
10.129
10.130
10.131
10.132
10.133
10.134
11 Patent Misuse
I Introduction
11.1
11.2
11.3
11.4
11.5
11.6
11.7
11.8
II The Rules of Patent Misuse
11.9
11.10
11.11
11.12
A Per se misuse
a Patent-to-product tying, with market power
11.13
11.14
b Conditioning a licence on the payment of royalties on non-infringing products, with market power
11.15
11.16
11.17
c Exclusive dealing with market power
11.18
d Naked, horizontal price-fixing and market division
11.19
11.20
11.21
B Potential misuse under the rule of reason
11.22
a Securing exclusive rights over a product exhausted under the first-sale doctrine
11.23
11.24
b Patent-to-patent tying
11.25
11.26
11.27
11.28
11.29
11.30
11.31
11.32
11.33
11.34
11.35
11.36
c Field of use restrictions
11.37
11.38
11.39
11.40
11.41
d Grantback agreements
11.42
11.43
11.44
e Misusing patents through aggregation
11.45
11.46
11.47
11.48
III Conclusion
11.49
11.50
11.51
11.52
11.53
Part VI Agreements Concerning Patented Technology
12 Technology Transfer
I Introduction
12.1
12.2
12.3
12.4
12.5
12.6
II US Antitrust Rules on Patent Licensing
A Overview
12.7
12.8
12.9
12.10
B Antitrust rules governing patent licensing
12.11
a Fixing prices through a patent licence
12.12
12.13
12.14
12.15
12.16
12.17
12.18
b Exclusive licences
12.19
12.20
12.21
12.22
12.23
12.24
12.25
12.26
c Field of use restrictions
12.27
12.28
12.29
12.30
12.31
d Grantback provisions
12.32
12.33
12.34
12.35
12.36
12.37
e Patent-based tying
12.38
12.39
12.40
f Portfolio cross-licensing and patent pools
12.41
(a) Background
12.42
12.43
12.44
12.45
(b) Antitrust analysis
12.46
12.47
12.48
12.49
12.50
12.51
12.52
12.53
III Technology Transfer under EU Competition Law
12.54
12.55
A The Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation
a The TTBER’s core provisions
12.56
12.57
12.58
12.59
12.60
12.61
12.62
b Hardcore restrictions
12.63
12.64
12.65
c The meaning of an ‘excluded restriction’
12.66
B Licensing restrictions that do not qualify for block exemption
12.67
12.68
12.69
a Exclusive and sole licences
12.70
12.71
12.72
12.73
12.74
b Sales restrictions
12.75
12.76
12.77
12.78
c Output restrictions
12.79
12.80
12.81
d Field of use restrictions
12.82
12.83
e Captive-use restrictions
12.84
12.85
12.86
12.87
f Tying and bundling
12.88
12.89
12.90
g Non-compete obligations
12.91
12.92
12.93
C Technology pools
12.94
a Guiding principles on patent pools
12.95
12.96
12.97
b Safe harbour
12.98
12.99
12.100
12.101
c Licensing agreements between a patent pool and its licensees
12.102
12.103
12.104
12.105
13 Exclusionary Agreements in the Biopharmaceutical Industry
I Introduction
13.1
13.2
13.3
13.4
13.5
13.6
13.7
II The Economic Effects of Reverse-Exclusionary Payments
13.8
A Reverse payments reflect patent weakness and are generally inefficient
13.9
a Absent sham, conventional patent settlements are efficient, even though they foreclose validity challenges
13.10
13.11
b Reverse exclusionary payments generally harm social welfare
13.12
13.13
13.14
13.15
13.16
13.17
13.18
13.19
13.20
13.21
13.22
13.23
13.24
B Reverse payments in the pharmaceutical industry
13.25
13.26
13.27
a Example 1: paying for delay is prohibited
13.28
13.29
13.30
13.31
b Example 2: paying for delay to perpetuate monopoly
13.32
13.33
III Pay-for-Delay Agreements under US Law
13.34
13.35
13.36
A The Hatch-Waxman Act
13.37
13.38
13.39
13.40
13.41
B The FTC’s war against pay-for-delay agreements
13.42
13.43
13.44
13.45
13.46
13.47
C The basic law on pay-for-delay agreements after Actavis
13.48
13.49
13.50
13.51
13.52
13.53
D The lower courts weigh in on Actavis
13.54
a How the rule of reason applies to pay-for-delay agreements
13.55
13.56
13.57
13.58
b Does Actavis only apply to cash payments?
13.59
c What is a ‘large’ reverse payment?
13.60
13.61
IV Reverse-Exclusionary Agreements under EU Law
A Paying for delay in Europe
13.62
13.63
B The pharmaceutical sector inquiry report
13.64
13.65
13.66
13.67
13.68
13.69
13.70
13.71
13.72
C EU competition law on pay-for-delay agreements
13.73
13.74
a The Commission condemns Servier’s pay-for-delay deals
13.75
13.76
13.77
13.78
13.79
13.80
13.81
13.82
13.83
b The Lundbeck decision
13.84
13.85
c Conclusion
13.86
Conclusion
14 Closing Thoughts
14.1
14.2
14.3
14.4
14.5
Further Material
Index
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Table of Contents
Edited By: Lars Kjølbye (Consultant editor)
From:
Antitrust and Patent Law
Alan Devlin
Edited By: Lars Kjølbye (Consultant editor)
Content type:
Book content
Product:
Oxford Competition Law [OCL]
Published in print:
17 March 2016
ISBN:
9780198728979
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