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Part II The Patent and Antitrust Laws of Europe and America, 4 How the EU and US Antitrust Regimes Differ

Edited By: Lars Kjølbye

From: Antitrust and Patent Law

Alan Devlin
Edited By: Lars Kjølbye (Consultant editor)

From: Oxford Competition Law (http://oxcat.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved.date: 22 October 2021

European Union — Copyright — Rights — Royalties — United States

This chapter first explains the reasons why Europe’s and America’s antitrust rules diverge, including competing narratives on the meaning of consumer welfare; the European pursuit of integration vs. the US open economy; the different role of economics in EU and US competition law; and different sociopolitical views on dominant firms. It discusses how EU and US competition laws diverge, covering issues such as asymmetric spheres of coverage, vertical restraints, dominance, predatory pricing, product typing, refusals to deal, and bundled and loyalty discounts. It argues that distinctions between US and EU law matter for international firms formulating business strategies. Potentially dominant undertakings in Europe must tread cautiously since actions that fetter their rivals’ access to markets, customers, or inputs invite trouble. This is not to say, of course, that firms have nothing to worry about in the United States. Plaintiffs accusing companies of antitrust wrongdoing must satisfy more exacting legal standards under US law.

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