User Account
- Personal Profile: Sign in
- or Create
- See all online law products
- Browse all
- Content type
-
- Case reports
- Domestic court decisions
- NCA decisions
- European court cases
-
- Commentary and analysis
- Book content
- European instruments and materials
- EU directives
- EU regulations
- EU decisions
- European Commission recommendations
- European Commission notices
- European Commission guidelines
-
- International instruments and materials
- Treaties
- Supporting instruments
- Other instruments and materials
- Official publications
-
- Subject
- Bellamy & Child
- Faull & Nikpay
- Whish & Bailey
-
My Content
(0)
Recently viewed (0)
-
My Searches (0)
Recently viewed (0)
Subscriber sign in
- Preliminary Material
- Editors
- Foreword to the 3rd Edition
- Preface
- Contents—Summary
- Contents
- List of Abbreviations
- Table of Cases
- Table Of Treaties and Legislation
- Main Text
- Part I General Principles
- 1 The Economics of Competition
- Preliminary Material
- A Introduction
- B Structure, Conduct, Performance
- C Static Welfare Analysis of Market Power
- (1) Introduction
- (2) Basic Microeconomic Concepts
- (3) Perfect Competition
- (4) Monopoly
- (5) Oligopoly
- D Dynamic Welfare Analysis of Market Power
- E Market Definition
- F Market Power and Dominance
- G Empirical Methods for Market Definition and the Assessment of Market Power
- 2 The Enforcement System Under Regulation 1/2003
- Preliminary Material
- A Direct Application of Articles 101 and 102
- B The Relationship Between EU Competition Law and National Competition Law
- C Powers and Decisions of National Competition Authorities
- D Commission Powers and Decisions
- (1) Introduction
- (2) Article 7: Finding and Termination of Infringements
- (3) Article 8: Interim Measures
- (4) Article 9: Commitments
- (5) Article 10: Finding of Inapplicability
- E Cooperation Between Enforcers
- (1) Introduction
- (2) Cooperation within the ECN
- 2.155
- (a) The Sharing of Work Amongst the Competition Authorities
- (b) An NCA’s Request to Another NCA to Carry Out an Investigation
- (c) Exchange of Information and Its Use in Evidence
- 2.163
- 2.164
- (i) Exchange of Information within the ECN
- (ii) The Use of the Exchanged Information in Evidence
- (iii) The Use in Evidence of the Information Exchanged within the ECN
- 2.177
- 2.178
- (i) The General Principles of EU Law
- (ii) Information Exchanged Can Only Be Used in Evidence for the Application of EU Competition Rules
- (iii) Information Exchanged Can Only Be Used in Evidence in Respect of the Subject Matter for Which it was Collected
- (iv) The Limitations With Regard to the Use of Information in Evidence to Impose Sanctions on Natural Persons
- 2.191 Experience with Article 12
- (d) The Obligation of Professional Secrecy and the Need to Disclose Information
- (3) Coherent Application within the ECN
- (4) Coherent Application by National Courts
- (a) The Competence of National Courts to Apply EU Competition Rules
- (b) The Coherent Application of EU Competition Rules by National Courts
- 2.254
- 2.255
- 2.256
- 2.257
- 2.258 Commission Initiatives towards Coherent Application of EU Competition Rules
- (i) The Commission’s Policy Notices and Guidelines
- (ii) Co-Financing the Training of National Judges in EU Competition Rules
- 2.263 A Database on National Judgments
- (ii) Consistency in the Case of Parallel or Consecutive Application of EU Competition Rules
- (c) Cooperation Between the Commission and the National Courts
- 3 Article 101
- Preliminary Material
- A Introduction
- B Scope of Article 101
- C Article 101(1)
- 3.23
- 3.24
- 3.25
- 3.26
- (1) Undertakings
- (a) Definition
- (b) Professions
- (c) Public Bodies Exception
- (d) The Single Economic Unit Doctrine (No Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy in EU Law)
- (e) Successor Undertakings
- (2) Agreements
- (a) General Definition
- (b) Requires At Least Two Undertakings
- (c) Form Irrelevant
- (d) Does the Notion of ‘Agreement’ Presuppose that the Parties Jointly Intend to Limit Their Freedom of Action as Regards Future Conduct on the Market?
- (e) Single Continuous Infringement Doctrine
- (f) Tacit Acquiescence in Relation to the Particular Anti-Competitive Measure in Question is the Minimum Requirement in Vertical Cases
- (g) Formal Termination May Not be Sufficient
- (h) Judicial Settlement
- (3) Decisions by Associations of Undertakings
- (4) Concerted Practices
- (5) Distinction Between Agreements and Concerted Practices
- (6) State Compulsion
- (7) The Notion of Restriction of Competition under EU Competition Law
- (8) Restriction by Object
- (9) Restriction by Effect
- 3.219
- 3.220
- 3.221
- 3.222
- (a) The EU Courts Had Broadly Endorsed the Commission’s Traditional Approach
- (b) The EU Courts Have Modified the Traditional Approach in a Number of Important Ways
- (c) Restrictions of Rivalry Must Be Assessed in Their Market Context
- (d) Ancillary Restraints Doctrine
- (e) Exclusivity Necessary for Supply
- 3.271
- 3.272
- 3.273 Exclusivity Must be Objectively Necessary
- (ii) It is Unclear Whether this Doctrine Applies to Agreements Between Competitors
- (iii) Doctrine Only Likely to Apply in Clear-Cut Cases
- 3.288 Does the Approach Apply to ‘Object’ Cases?
- (v) Difference Between Exclusivity Necessary for Supply and Ancillary Restraints Doctrines
- (f) Appreciability
- (g) Cumulative Effects Doctrine
- (h) The Purpose of the Market Analysis
- (i) Extent of Market Analysis
- (j) Restrictive Clauses Are Not a Necessary Condition for the Application of Article 101(1)
- (k) The Commission’s Policy as set out in the Article 101(3) Guidelines
- (l) The Current State of Affairs: Developments in the Commission’s Policy and the EU Courts’ Case Law Subsequent to the Article 101(3) Guidelines
- D Jurisdiction
- (1) General
- (2) The Concept of Trade Between Member States
- (3) The Link Between Trade and the Agreement or Practice
- (4) The Notion of ‘May Affect’
- (5) Appreciability
- (6) Assessment of Various Types of Agreement and Practices
- (a) Introduction
- (b) Agreements and Practices Concerning Imports and Exports and Agreements and Practices Implemented in Several Member States
- (c) Agreements and Practices Confined to the Whole or Part of a Member State
- (d) Agreements and Practices Covering Part of a Member State
- (e) Agreements and Practices Involving Third Countries
- E Article 101(2)
- F The Article 101(3) Exception
- (1) Introduction
- (2) The Relationship Between Article 101(1) and Article 101(3)
- (3) General Principles for the Application of Article 101(3)
- (4) The Four Conditions of Article 101(3)
- (a) Introduction
- (b) The First Test of Article 101(3): Efficiency Gains
- (c) The Second Test of Article 101(3): Indispensability
- (d) The Third Test of Article 101(3): A Fair Share for Consumers
- (e) The Fourth Test of Article 101(3): No Elimination of Competition in Respect of a Substantial Part of the Products in Question
- 4 Article 102
- Preliminary Material
- A The System of Enforcement of Article 102
- (1) Introduction
- (2) Categorization of Abuses: Exploitative vs Exclusionary
- (3) Consequences of Infringement of Article 102
- (4) Commitment Decisions (Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003)
- (5) Judicial Review of Article 102 Decisions
- B The Article 102 Enforcement Priorities Guidance
- (1) The Emergence of the Effects-Based Approach
- (2) The Commission’s Review of Article 102 Policy
- (3) The Article 102 Enforcement Priorities Guidance
- C Dominance
- 4.122
- (1) Concept of Single Dominance
- (2) Factors Relevant to Single Dominance
- 4.139
- (a) Economic Measurement of Market Power
- (b) Factors Under the Case Law and the Commission’s Guidance
- 4.143
- 4.144 The Position of the Undertaking Concerned and Its Competitors
- (i) Market Definition
- 4.149 Market Shares
- 4.150 Calculation methods
- Market share as indicators of market power
- Inferences from market share levels under the case law
- AKZO
- Inferences from market share levels under the Guidance
- (iii) Profitability of the Undertaking
- (iv) Conduct of the Undertaking
- (v) The Position of Competitors
- (ii) Barriers to Entry and Expansion
- 4.180
- 4.181
- 4.182
- 4.183
- 4.184
- 4.185
- (i) Regulatory Barriers to Entry
- 4.191 Capacity Constraints
- (iii) Economies of Scale and Scope
- (iv) Network Effects
- 4.201 Switching Costs
- (vi) Vertical Integration and Exclusive or Preferential Access to Inputs or Customers
- (vii) Financial Strength
- (viii) Spare or Excess Capacity
- (ix) Other Factors
- (iii) Countervailing Buyer Power
- (3) Concept of Collective Dominance
- (4) Abuse of a Collective Dominant Position
- (5) Dominance and Abuse in Neighbouring Markets
- (6) Dominance in New Economy Markets
- D Concept of Abuse
- (1) General Concept of Abuse
- (2) Definition of Abuse Under the EU Courts’ Case Law
- (3) The Test for Abuse
- (4) The Special Responsibility of the Dominant Undertaking
- (5) Objective Justification
- E Predatory Pricing
- (1) What is Predatory Pricing?
- (2) Predation Under EU Law: The AKZO Test
- (3) The Predation Test in the Article 102 Enforcement Priorities Guidance
- F Exclusive Dealing: Exclusivity Obligations and Loyalty Rebates
- (1) Case Law and Commission Decisional Practice
- (2) Policy and Effects-Based Approach
- (a) Commission’s Approach Under the Article 102 Enforcement Priorities Guidance
- (b) The Logic of the Commission’s Approach Towards Loyalty Rebates and Exclusive Dealing
- (c) Identifying Anti-Competitive Foreclosure Under the Article 102 Enforcement Priorities Guidance
- (d) The Limits of the Article 102 Enforcement Priorities Guidance Approach
- (e) The Commission’s Application of the New Approach
- G Tying and Bundling
- (1) Introduction
- (2) Legal Analysis and Case Law on Tying
- (3) Case Law on Mixed Bundling
- (4) Policy and Effects-Based Approach
- H Refusal to Supply
- (1) Concept of Abusive Refusal to Supply
- (2) Basic Elements
- (3) Types of Refusal to Supply
- (4) Potential Anti-Competitive Effects of Refusals to Supply
- (5) The Case Law on Refusal to Supply
- (a) General Framework
- (b) Indispensability
- (c) The Foreclosure Effect
- (d) Raising Rivals’ Costs as Exclusionary Effect?
- (e) The Foreclosure Effect and the ‘Essential Facilities’ Doctrine in Commission Practice
- (f) Consumer Harm
- (g) Interoperability Cases Since Microsoft
- (h) Refusal to Supply an Existing Customer
- (i) Defences (Objective Necessity and Objective Justification)
- (6) The Approach Under the Commission’s Guidance
- (7) Refusal to Supply and Patents
- I Margin Squeeze
- (1) Concept of a Margin Squeeze Abuse
- (2) Legal Analysis of Margin Squeeze
- (a) The Early Case Law
- (b) Elements of the Abuse
- 4.646
- 4.647
- 4.648
- 4.649
- 4.650
- 4.651 Margin Squeeze is a Stand-Alone Abuse
- (ii) The Need to Demonstrate an Anti-Competitive Effect
- (iii) Factors Relevant to Assessing Potential Anti-Competitive Effect
- (iv) Anti-Competitive Effect is Assessed by Reference to the ‘As-Efficient Competitor’ Test
- (v) Basis for Calculating Potential Effects is the Cost Data of the Dominant Undertaking
- 4.664 A Margin Squeeze is Capable of Objective Justification
- (vii) Level of Dominance Goes to Effect, Not to the Existence of the Abuse
- (3) Economic Assessment
- (4) Interplay Between Margin Squeeze and Refusal to Deal: Indispensability
- (5) Interplay Between Margin Squeeze and Regulatory Obligations
- J Specific Abusive Practices in Relation to IP Rights
- (1) Introduction
- (2) Supply of Misleading Information to Extend Patent Validity
- (3) Withdrawal of Marketing Authorization to Restrict Entry of Generics
- (4) Patent Filing Strategies
- (5) Patent Settlements With Reverse Payments (Pay for Delay)
- (6) Patent Hold-Up in the Context of Standard Setting
- (a) Context: Standard Setting and Patent Hold-Up Possibilities
- (b) Patent Ambush
- (c) FRAND Hold-Up
- (7) Anti-Competitive Litigation in Relation to Standard Essential Patents
- (8) Issues Applicable Across IP Rights Cases
- K Exploitative Abuses
- (1) Concept of Excessive Pricing
- (2) The Test for Excessive Pricing Under EU Case Law
- (3) Imposing Other Unfair Terms
- (4) Economic Approach to Excessive Pricing
- (5) Unfairly Low Prices Extracted by Dominant Buyers
- (6) Limiting Production, Markets, or Technical Development
- L Price Discrimination
- (1) Concept of Price Discrimination
- (2) Competition Concerns Regarding Price Discrimination
- (3) Case Law and Commission Practice on Article 102(c) Discriminatory Pricing Abuses
- (4) Policy and Effects-Based Approach
- 5 Mergers
- Preliminary Material
- A Introduction
- B Jurisdiction
- (1) Overview
- (2) The Concept of a Concentration: Merger
- (3) The Concept of a Concentration: Acquisition of Control
- (a) Overview
- (b) Control
- (c) The Acquisition of Sole Control
- (d) The Acquisition of Joint Control
- (e) Changes in the Structure and/or Quality of Control
- (f) Non-Controlling Minority Shareholdings (Structural Links)
- (g) Exceptions Under Article 3(5) of the Merger Regulation
- (4) Joint Ventures
- (5) Interrelated and Staggered Operations
- (6) Ancillary Restraints
- (7) The Requirement of an EU Dimension
- (8) The Calculation of Relevant Turnover
- C Interaction with Member States and Third Countries
- (1) Introduction
- (2) Reallocation of Jurisdiction between the Commission and Member States (‘Referrals’)
- (a) Purpose of the Referral System
- (b) Use of the Referral System Over Time
- (c) Guiding Principles Applied when Considering Referral Requests
- (d) Operation of the Referral System in Practice
- 5.222
- 5.223
- 5.224 Referrals from the Commission to One or More NCAs
- (i) Pre-Notification Referrals Requested by the Parties (Article 4(4))
- (ii) Post-Notification Referrals Requested by an NCA (Article 9)
- 5.255 Referrals From One or More NCAs to the Commission
- (i) Pre-Notification Referrals Requested by the Parties (Article 4(5))
- (ii) Post-notification Referrals Requested by an NCA (Article 22)
- (e) Evaluation and Reform of the Referral System
- (3) Member State Action on Non-Competition Grounds
- (4) Concentrations in the Defence Sector
- (5) Cooperation Between the Commission and Member States
- (6) Merger Control in the EEA Context
- (7) International Cooperation in Merger Control
- D Merger Control Procedure
- (1) Introduction
- (2) Principal Features of the Procedural Framework
- (3) The Main Steps and Timetable for EU Merger Control Proceedings
- (4) The Pre-Notification Phase
- (a) Introduction
- (b) Timing of Pre-Notification Contacts
- (c) Initial Contact and Request for a Case Team
- (d) Confidentiality
- (e) Discussions on Jurisdiction
- (f) Discussions on Substance, Procedure, and Timing
- (g) Review of Draft(s) Form CO and Requests for Waivers
- (h) Submission of Internal Documents
- (i) Fact Finding: Contacts with Third Parties
- (j) Green Light for Notification
- (5) Notification of a Concentration
- (6) Phase I
- (7) Phase II: In-Depth Investigation
- (a) Introduction
- (b) Procedural Safeguards in Phase II
- (c) Timetable and Deadlines
- (d) Initial Stage: Review of Key Documents, Reply to the Article 6(1)(c) Decision and State of Play Meeting
- (e) In-Depth Investigation
- (f) Where the Competition Concerns are Dispelled
- (g) Where Competition Concerns Remain
- (h) The Statement of Objections
- (i) Access to File
- (j) Reply to the SO and Oral Hearing
- (k) The Post-SO/Oral Hearing Stage
- (l) Decision
- (m) Notification and Publication
- (n) Post-Decision Remedies Process
- (8) The Simplified Procedure
- (9) Abandonment of a Concentration, Withdrawal and Re-submission of a Notification, Change of an Authorized Transaction
- (10) Particular Procedures
- E Substantive Assessment
- (1) Main Elements of the Assessment under Article 2 of the Merger Regulation
- (2) Definition of the Relevant Market
- 5.587
- 5.588
- 5.589
- 5.590
- (a) Relevant Product Market
- (b) Relevant Geographic Market
- (c) The SSNIP Test and Critical Loss Analysis
- (d) Price Discrimination Markets
- (e) Factors Relevant to Market Definition and Types of Evidence Relied On
- (f) Market Definition for Merger Cases and Antitrust Cases are Similar but Distinct
- (g) Is Market Definition Really Necessary in an Effects-Based Analysis?
- (3) Analysis of the Effects of a Concentration
- (4) Horizontal Mergers
- (a) Non-Coordinated Effects (Unilateral Effects)
- (i) Market Share Thresholds
- (ii) Intervention Thresholds: Removal of a Significant Competitive Constraint
- (iii) Assessment of Effect: Additional Factors
- (iv) Differentiated Product Markets: Closeness of Competition
- (v) Homogeneous Product Markets: Capacity
- (vi) Multi-Sourcing
- (vii) Ability to Hinder Expansion
- (viii) Merger with a Potential Competitor
- (ix) Buyer Power Created by the Merger
- (b) Coordinated Effects
- (i) Concept and History
- 5.776 Analytical Framework
- 5.777 The Airtours Criteria
- (ii) The Approach Under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines
- 5.782 Creating Coordination or Strengthening Existing Coordination
- (i) Creating Coordination
- (ii) Strengthening Coordination
- 5.791 The Criteria for Coordination
- 5.792 Reaching Terms of Coordination (A Conducive Market Environment)
- (ii) Monitoring Deviations
- (iii) Adequate Deterrent Mechanisms
- (iv) Reactions of Outsiders
- (a) Non-Coordinated Effects (Unilateral Effects)
- (5) Non-Horizontal Assessment
- (a) Non-Coordinated Effects (Unilateral Effects)
- 5.810
- 5.811
- 5.812
- (i) Theories of Harm
- (ii) Who is Entitled to Protection From the Potential Effects of Non-Horizontal Mergers?
- (iii) Framework for Analysing Foreclosure
- (i) Ability to Foreclose
- (ii) Incentive
- (iii) Effect
- 5.860 The Diminished Role of Dominance in Non-Horizontal Cases
- (i) Dominance is Not Necessary
- (ii) Effects May Come Faster Than Dominance
- (b) Coordinated Effects
- (a) Non-Coordinated Effects (Unilateral Effects)
- (6) Countervailing Factors
- 5.874
- 5.875
- 5.876
- (a) Buyer Power
- (b) Entry
- (c) Efficiencies
- (d) Failing Firm Defence
- F Remedies
- (1) Overview
- (2) General Principles
- (3) Conditions That Remedies Must Meet
- (4) Remedies in Phase I and Phase II
- (5) Types of Remedies
- (a) Typology and Terminology
- (b) Acceptability of the Various Categories
- (c) Divestiture of a Business
- (d) Removal of Links with Competitors
- (e) Access Remedies
- (f) Commitments to Enter Into, Modify, or Terminate Long-Term Agreements
- (g) Conduct Remedies in Conglomerate Cases
- (h) Other Conduct Remedies
- (6) Implementation and Modification of Remedies Post-Decision
- G Judicial Review
- 6 Article 106—Exclusive or Special Rights and other Anti-Competitive State Measures
- Preliminary Material
- A Introduction
- B Application of Articles 4(3) and 3(3) TEU and Articles 101 and 102 TFEU to Anti-Competitive State Measures
- C Article 106(1): State Measures in Respect of Public or Privileged Undertakings
- (1) Addressees and Regulatory Content
- (2) State Measures
- 6.10
- 6.11 Formal Criteria Are Not Decisive in Defining ‘State Measures’
- 6.12 The Function of the Act is the Decisive Factor in Defining ‘State Measures’
- 6.13 The Form of the Act Creates a Presumption, But Its Function is the Decisive Criterion in Defining It as a ‘State Measure’
- 6.14 State Measures May Be Adopted By Any Type of Public Authority
- (3) Related to Public or Privileged Undertakings
- 6.15
- (a) ‘Economic Activity’
- 6.16 Article 106(1) Applies to State Regulation of Economic Activities
- 6.17 Definition of ‘Economic Activity’
- (iii) Criteria Used By the Court of Justice
- 6.26 ‘Public’ Undertaking
- 6.27 Definition of Public Undertaking
- 6.28 A Separate Legal Entity is Not Necessary
- 6.29 Public Undertakings After Privatization
- 6.30 ‘Privileged’ Undertakings
- (b) Exclusive Rights
- (c) The Connection Between the Measure and the Undertaking
- (i) Types of Connection Required by Article 106(1)
- 6.44 State Measures Which Benefit the Undertaking
- 6.45 State Measures Which Use the Undertaking as an Instrument
- (iv) State Measures Granting an Exclusive Right
- 6.48 The Dual Role of Exclusive Rights Within Article 106(1)
- 6.49 General Measures Do Not Fall Under Article 106(1)
- (4) Contrary to Another Provision of the TFEU
- (5) Article 106(1) in Combination with the Competition Rules Addressed to Undertakings
- 6.53
- (a) Article 106(1) in Combination with Article 102
- (b) State Measures Affecting the Structure of Competition and Leading to Potential Abusive Behaviour of Undertakings
- 6.62 No Requirement for Actual Abuse
- 6.63 The Granting of Regulatory Powers to an Undertaking
- 6.64 The ‘Bundling’ of Regulatory and Commercial Activities
- 6.65 The Granting of an Exclusive Right
- 6.66 The Demand Limitation Doctrine
- (vi) The Conflict of Interest Doctrine
- 6.69 Presumption of Causal Link
- 6.70 Effects Similar to Those of Abusive Behaviour
- (ix) The Doctrine of the Extension of a Dominant Position
- (x) The Automatic Abuse Doctrine
- 6.82 The La Crespelle Case
- (xii) More Recent Cases
- (xiii) The Current Status Quo
- (xiv) Effect on Intra-EU Trade
- (c) Article 106(1) in Combination with Article 101
- (6) Article 106(1) in Combination with the Treaty Rules Addressed to the Member States
- (a) The Double Function of Article 106(1)
- (b) Article 106(1) in Combination with the Rules on Free Movement of Goods: Articles 34 and 37
- 6.104
- 6.105
- (i) The General Regime: Measures of Equivalent Effect and Article 34
- 6.110 The Special Regime: State Monopolies and Article 37
- 6.111 ‘State monopolies of a commercial character’
- 6.112 Obligations Contained in Article 37
- (v) Obligations During the Transitional Period
- (vi) Obligations After the Transitional Period
- (vii) The Borderline Between the General and Special Regimes
- (c) Article 106(1) in Combination with the Rules on Freedom to Provide Services and on Establishment: Articles 49 and 56
- (7) Direct Effect
- D Article 106(2): Services of General Economic Interest and Other Public Interest Objectives
- 6.136
- 6.137
- (1) The Undertakings to which Article 106(2) Relates
- (2) Article 106(2) as an Exception Applicable to the Behaviour of Undertakings and to State Measures
- (3) Conditions for the Application of Article 106(2)
- 6.167
- 6.168 The Necessity of the Measure
- (ii) The Proportionality Principle
- 6.175 The Old Approach: A Strict Interpretation of the Proportionality Test
- (iv) The Need for a More Flexible Interpretation
- (v) Universal Service as a Justification for Exclusive Rights
- (vi) The Corbeau Case
- (vii) The Almelo Case
- (viii) Other Cases
- (ix) Case law of the General Court
- 6.207 Need for an Economic Analysis
- 6.208 The Dynamic Character of Proportionality
- 6.209 Different Approaches Depending on the Sector
- (xiii) The Strict Approach and the Flexible Approach
- 6.212 Universal Services and Other Services of General Economic Interest
- 6.213 Examples of Measures Considered Non-Proportional
- (xvi) The Interest of the EU
- (4) Invocation of Article 106(2) and Burden of Proof
- (5) Relationship between Article 106(2) and Other Exceptions
- (6) Relationship between Article 106(2) and Article 14
- E Article 106(3): Procedural Rules Applying to Anti-Competitive State Measures
- 6.228
- (1) Article 106(3) Decisions
- 6.229 General Issues
- 6.230 Analogy With Other Procedures
- (iii) Discretionary Character of the Procedure Under Article 106(3)
- 6.236 Lodging of Complaints and Ex Officio Cases
- (v) Dismissal of Complaints
- (a) The Infringement Procedure
- 6.242 Interim Measures
- 6.243 Letter of Formal Notice
- 6.244 The Rights of the Member State and of the Undertaking that Benefits from the Measure
- 6.245 End of the Procedure Without a Formal Decision
- (v) The Formal Decision and Its Effects
- 6.248 Binding Effects
- 6.249 Action for Annulment Against an Article 106(3) Decision
- (viii) Action for Failure to Implement an Article 106(3) Decision
- (2) Article 106(3) Directives
- (3) Legal Regime of Article 106(3) Directives
- 6.260 The Exclusive Competence of the Commission
- 6.261 Limits to the Commission’s Competence
- 6.262 Article 106(3) Directives Cannot Deal With the Autonomous Behaviour of Undertakings
- (iv) Formal Limits to the Commission’s Power under Article 106(3)
- 6.265 Binding Effects
- 6.266 Lack of Direct Effect
- 6.267 Relationship Between Directives Under Article 106(3) and Harmonizing Directives
- 6.268 Article 106(3) Overlaps With Other Treaty Provisions
- (ix) Article 106(3) Overlaps with Article 14
- 6.271 The Dissuasive Role of Article 106(3)
- 1 The Economics of Competition
- Part II Specific Practices
- 7 Horizontal Cooperation Agreements
- Preliminary Material
- A Introduction
- B Assessment of Horizontal Cooperation Agreements under Article 101
- C Joint Ventures Involving Joint Control
- (1) Definition and Constitution of a Joint Venture
- (2) Distinction Between Cooperative and Concentrative Joint Ventures
- (3) The Rationale Behind the Difference in Treatment Between Full-Function Concentrative and Full-Function Cooperative Joint Ventures
- (4) The Application of Article 101(1) by the Commission to Cooperative Joint Ventures Prior to the Entry into Force of the 1997 Amendment to the First Merger Regulation
- (5) The Notion and Role of Potential Competition in Assessing the Validity of Joint Ventures under Article 101
- (6) Conditions Leading to the Incentive to Coordinate (Spillover Effects)
- (7) Direct Contractual Restrictions Between Parents
- (8) Intra-Group Agreements and Joint Ventures
- (9) Spillovers under the Merger Regulation
- 7 Horizontal Cooperation Agreements
- Part I General Principles