Index
From: EU Merger Control: A Legal and Economic Analysis
Ioannis Kokkoris, Howard Shelanski
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- Preliminary Material
- Main Text
- 1 Introduction
- 2 History of Council Regulation 4064/89
- 3 Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004
- Preliminary Material
- A Three Seminal Cases
- B Substantive Reforms to Merger Regulation
- C Procedural Reforms
- D Jurisdictional Reforms
- E The Horizontal Merger Guidelines
- 3.113
- 3.114
- 3.115
- 3.116
- 3.117
- 3.118
- 3.119
- (1) Assessment of non-coordinated effects
- 3.120
- 3.121
- (a) Market share assessment
- (b) Merging firms are close competitors
- Customers Have Limited Possibilities of Switching Between Suppliers
- (c) Competitors are unlikely to increase supply if prices increase
- (d) Merged entity is able to hinder expansion by competitors
- (e) Merger eliminates an important competitive force
- (2) Assessment of coordinated effects
- (3) Countervailing buyer power
- (4) Barriers to entry
- (5) Efficiencies
- (6) Failing firm defence
- F The Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines
- 3.163
- 3.164
- 3.165
- (1) Production efficiencies and cost savings
- (2) Vertical externalities and exclusivity
- (3) Transaction costs and the hold-up problem
- (4) Vertical mergers assessment
- 3.198
- (a) Non-coordinated effects
- (b) Coordinated effects
- (5) Conglomerate merger assessment
- G Concluding Remarks
- 4 Community Jurisdiction I: Concentration and Control
- 5 Community Jurisdiction II: Notification and Review
- Preliminary Material
- 5.01
- 5.02
- 5.03
- A The Community Dimension Test
- B Turnover
- C Exceptions to the Community Dimension Test
- D The Merger Control Process
- E Parallel Notifications
- F Derogation from Notification
- G Abandoned Concentrations
- H Internal Changes after 2004
- I Fines
- J Standard of Proof
- 6 Market Definition
- 7 Horizontal Mergers—Non-Coordinated Effects
- Preliminary Material
- 7.01
- 7.02
- 7.03
- 7.04
- 7.05
- 7.06
- 7.07
- A Non-coordinated Effects of Horizontal Mergers
- 7.08
- 7.09
- 7.10
- 7.11
- 7.12
- (1) Assessment of non-coordinated effects
- 7.13
- 7.14
- 7.15
- 7.16
- 7.17
- 7.18
- 7.19
- (a) Market share and concentration levels
- (b) Merging firms are close competitors
- (c) Customers have limited possibilities of switching between suppliers
- (d) Competitors are unlikely to increase supply if prices increase
- (e) Merged entity is able to hinder expansion by competitors
- (f) Merger eliminates an important competitive force
- (2) Network markets
- (3) Importance of the assessment factors
- B Horizontal Mergers Leading to Non-coordinated Effects in Oligopolistic Markets
- 8 Horizontal Mergers—Coordinated Effects
- Preliminary Material
- 8.01
- 8.02
- 8.03
- 8.04
- 8.05
- 8.06
- 8.07
- 8.08
- 8.09
- 8.10
- A Background of Collective Dominance and Coordinated Effects
- B Development of Assessment Criteria
- 8.23
- 8.24
- 8.25
- 8.26
- 8.27
- 8.28
- (1) Degree of concentration
- (2) Barriers to entry
- (3) Product homogeneity
- (4) Price elasticity
- (5) Symmetric market conditions
- (6) Market stability and technologically mature markets
- (7) Past and current conduct of firms
- (8) Vertical integration and multi-market contacts
- (9) Links between firms
- (10) Is there an assessment checklist?
- C Nestlé/Perrier: The Development of the Criteria
- D The Airtours Case
- E Sony/BMG – Impala
- F Coordinated Effects of Mergers in Cartelized Industries
- G Illegality of Future Conducts as a Deterrence of Anticompetitive Effects Arising from a Merger
- H Concluding Remarks
- I Appendix
- 9 Non-Horizontal Mergers
- Preliminary Material
- 9.01
- 9.02
- A Pro-competitive Nature of Non-Horizontal Mergers
- B Initial Era of Non-Horizontal Merger Assessment
- C Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines
- D Assessment of Vertical Mergers
- E Conglomerate Merger Assessment
- 10 Entry and Potential Competition
- Preliminary Material
- 10.01
- A Barriers to Entry
- B Potential Competition
- 11 Buyer Power
- Preliminary Material
- 11.01
- 11.02
- 11.03
- 11.04
- 11.05
- A Buyer Power: A Boon and a Menace
- B A Boon: Countervailing Buyer Power
- C A Menace: Buyer Market Power
- D Some Specific Thoughts on Buyer Power
- E Market Definition and Buyer Power
- F Measures to Assess Buyer Power
- G Consequences of Buyer Power
- H Assessment of Buyer Power by Competition Authorities
- I Concluding Remarks
- 12 Efficiency Assessment
- Preliminary Material
- A Types of Efficiencies
- B European Commission Approach towards Efficiencies
- C European Decision-making Practice
- D Examples of Efficiency Assessment
- E Seminal Case: Global/GCap
- F Seminal Case: European Directories/Gouden Gids
- G Concluding Remarks
- 13 Failing Firm Defence
- Preliminary Material
- A Failing firm defence
- B The European Union Perspective
- C Derogation: Removing the Suspension
- D Reflections on Failing Firm Defence
- E Concluding Remarks
- 14 Remedies
- Preliminary Material
- A Principles on Remedies
- B Remedies and their Taxonomy
- C Structural Remedies
- D Behavioural Remedies
- E Quasi-structural Remedies
- F Monitoring Commitments
- G A Clear Choice on the Type of Remedies?
- H Remedies in Periods of Crises
- I Concluding Remarks
- 15 Judicial Review
- Further Material
