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Oxford Law Citator
Contents
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EU Merger Control - A Legal and Economic Analysis by Kokkoris, Ioannis; Shelanski, Howard (1st January 2014)
Preliminary Material
Foreword
Preface
Contents
Tables of Cases
Tables of Legislation
Treaties and Conventions
European Secondary Legislation
Regulations
Directives
Other Jurisdictions
Australia
Germany
Ireland
New Zealand
UK
US
List of Abbreviations
Main Text
1 Introduction
Preliminary Material
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
A Reasons for Mergers and Acquisitions
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
B Are Mergers/Acquisitions Profitable?
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
1.23
1.24
1.25
1.26
1.27
1.28
C Purpose of Merger Legislation
1.29
1.30
1.31
1.32
1.33
1.34
1.35
1.36
1.37
1.38
1.39
1.40
1.41
1.42
1.43
1.44
2 History of Council Regulation 4064/89
Preliminary Material
A History of Merger Control
2.01
2.02
2.03
2.04
2.05
2.06
2.07
2.08
2.09
2.10
2.11
2.12
2.13
a
b
c
d
2.14
2.15
2.16
2.17
2.18
2.19
2.20
2.21
2.22
2.23
2.24
2.25
2.26
2.27
2.28
2.29
2.30
2.31
2.32
2.33
2.34
2.35
2.36
2.37
2.38
2.39
2.40
2.41
2.42
2.43
2.44
2.45
2.46
2.47
2.48
2.49
2.50
2.51
2.52
2.53
2.54
2.55
B Objectives and Welfare Standards of Merger Control
2.56
2.57
2.58
2.59
2.60
2.61
2.62
2.63
2.64
2.65
2.66
2.67
2.68
2.69
2.70
2.71
2.72
2.73
2.74
2.75
2.76
2.77
2.78
2.79
2.80
2.81
2.82
2.83
2.84
2.85
C Origins of the Notion of Dominance
2.86
2.87
2.88
2.89
2.90
2.91
2.92
2.93
2.94
2.95
2.96
3 Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004
Preliminary Material
A Three Seminal Cases
3.01
3.02
(1) The Schneider/Legrand case
3.03
3.04
3.05
3.06
3.07
3.08
3.09
3.10
3.11
3.12
3.13
3.14
3.15
3.16
3.17
3.18
3.19
(2) The Tetra Laval/Sidel case
3.20
3.21
3.22
3.23
3.24
3.25
3.26
3.27
3.28
3.29
(3) The Airtours/First Choice case
3.30
3.31
3.32
3.33
3.34
3.35
3.36
3.37
3.38
3.39
3.40
3.41
3.42
B Substantive Reforms to Merger Regulation
3.43
3.44
3.45
(1) Pros and cons of the SLC test and the dominance test
(a) The dominance test
3.46
3.47
3.48
3.49
3.50
3.51
3.52
3.53
3.54
3.55
3.56
3.57
3.58
3.59
(b) The SLC test
3.60
3.61
3.62
3.63
3.64
3.65
3.66
3.67
(c) SLC versus dominance
3.68
3.69
3.70
3.71
3.72
3.73
3.74
3.75
(d) The Commission’s choice
3.76
3.77
3.78
3.79
3.80
3.81
3.82
3.83
3.84
3.85
3.86
3.87
3.88
3.89
3.90
3.91
3.92
3.93
3.94
3.95
3.96
C Procedural Reforms
3.97
3.98
3.99
3.100
3.101
3.102
3.103
3.104
3.105
3.106
3.107
D Jurisdictional Reforms
3.108
3.109
3.110
3.111
3.112
E The Horizontal Merger Guidelines
3.113
3.114
3.115
3.116
3.117
3.118
3.119
(1) Assessment of non-coordinated effects
3.120
3.121
(a) Market share assessment
3.122
3.123
3.124
3.125
3.126
3.127
(b) Merging firms are close competitors
3.128
Customers Have Limited Possibilities of Switching Between Suppliers
3.129
(c) Competitors are unlikely to increase supply if prices increase
3.130
(d) Merged entity is able to hinder expansion by competitors
3.131
(e) Merger eliminates an important competitive force
3.132
3.133
(2) Assessment of coordinated effects
3.134
3.135
3.136
3.137
3.138
3.139
3.140
3.141
3.142
3.143
3.144
3.145
3.146
3.147
(3) Countervailing buyer power
3.148
3.149
(4) Barriers to entry
3.150
3.151
3.152
(5) Efficiencies
3.153
3.154
3.155
3.156
3.157
(6) Failing firm defence
3.158
3.159
3.160
3.161
3.162
F The Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines
3.163
3.164
3.165
(1) Production efficiencies and cost savings
3.166
3.167
3.168
(2) Vertical externalities and exclusivity
3.169
3.170
3.171
3.172
3.173
3.174
3.175
3.176
(3) Transaction costs and the hold-up problem
3.177
3.178
3.179
3.180
3.181
3.182
3.183
3.184
3.185
3.186
3.187
3.188
3.189
3.190
3.191
3.192
3.193
3.194
3.195
3.196
3.197
(4) Vertical mergers assessment
3.198
(a) Non-coordinated effects
3.199
3.200 Input foreclosure
3.201 Ability for input foreclosure
Incentive to foreclose access to inputs
3.202
3.203
Impact on effective competition
3.204
3.205
3.206 Customer foreclosure
Ability to foreclose access to downstream markets
3.207
3.208
3.209 Incentive to foreclose
3.210 Impact on effective competition
(b) Coordinated effects
3.211
3.212
3.213
3.214
(5) Conglomerate merger assessment
3.215
3.216
(a) Non-coordinated effects
3.217
3.218
3.219 Ability to foreclose
3.220 Incentive to foreclose
3.221 Impact on consumers
(b) Coordinated effects of conglomerate mergers
3.222
G Concluding Remarks
3.223
3.224
3.225
3.226
4 Community Jurisdiction I: Concentration and Control
Preliminary Material
4.01
4.02
4.03
4.04
4.05
A Definition of Concentration
4.06
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.10
4.11
4.12
4.13
4.14
4.15
4.16
4.17
4.18
B Concept of Control
4.19
4.20
C Acquisition and Change of Control
4.21
4.22
4.23
4.24
4.25
4.26
4.27
4.28
(1) Sole control
4.29
4.30
(2) Joint control
4.31
4.32
4.33
4.34
4.35
4.36
(3) Decisive influence
4.37
4.38
4.39
4.40
4.41
4.42
4.43
4.44
4.45
4.46
4.47
4.48
4.49
4.50
4.51
4.52
4.53
4.54
4.55
4.56
4.57
(4) Outsourcing
4.58
4.59
4.60
4.61
4.62
4.63
4.64
D The Concept of Single Concentration
4.65
4.66
4.67
4.68
4.69
4.70
(1) Pooling and spinning
4.71
4.72
(2) Warehousing and parking
4.73
4.74
4.75
4.76
4.77
(3) Options
4.78
4.79
4.80
4.81
E Joint Ventures
4.82
4.83
4.84
4.85
4.86
4.87
4.88
4.89
4.90
4.91
4.92
4.93
4.94
(1) Full-functionality criterion
4.95
4.96
4.97
4.98
4.99
4.100
4.101
4.102
F Ancillary Restraints
4.103
4.104
4.105
4.106
4.107
4.108
4.109
4.110
4.111
4.112
4.113
4.114
4.115
4.116
i
ii
iii
5 Community Jurisdiction II: Notification and Review
Preliminary Material
5.01
5.02
5.03
A The Community Dimension Test
5.04
5.05
5.06
5.07
B Turnover
5.08
a
b
i
ii
iii
iv
c
d
e
5.09
5.10
5.11
C Exceptions to the Community Dimension Test
5.12
(1) Article 21
5.13
5.14
(2) The referral system
5.15
5.16
5.17
5.18
(a) Pre-notification referrals: Article 4(4) and 4(5)
5.19
5.20
5.21
5.22
5.23
5.24
5.25
5.26
5.27
5.28
5.29
5.30
(b) Post-notification referral pursuant to Article 9 and 22
5.31
5.32
5.33
5.34
5.35
5.36
5.37
5.38
5.39
(c) Statistics of referrals
5.40
5.41
5.42
D The Merger Control Process
5.43
(1) Pre-notification
5.44
5.45
5.46
(2) Notification of the transaction
5.47
5.48
5.49
5.50
5.51
5.52
5.53
5.54
5.55
5.56
(3) Initial investigation—Phase I
5.57
5.58
5.59
5.60
5.61
5.62
5.63
5.64
5.65
(4) In-depth investigation—Phase II
5.66
5.67
5.68
5.69
5.70
5.71
(5) Access to file
5.72
5.73
5.74
5.75
5.76
5.77
(6) Oral hearing
5.78
5.79
5.80
5.81
5.82
5.83
5.84
5.85
E Parallel Notifications
5.86
5.87
5.88
5.89
5.90
5.91
5.92
5.93
5.94
5.95
F Derogation from Notification
5.96
5.97
5.98
5.99
5.100
5.101
5.102
5.103
G Abandoned Concentrations
5.104
5.105
5.106
5.107
H Internal Changes after 2004
5.108
5.109
5.110
5.111
5.112
I Fines
5.113
5.114
5.115
5.116
J Standard of Proof
5.117
5.118
5.119
5.120
5.121
5.122
5.123
6 Market Definition
Preliminary Material
A Aim of Market Definition
6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
6.07
6.08
6.09
6.10
6.11
B Substitutability and the SSNIP Test
6.12
6.13
6.14
6.15
6.16
6.17
6.18
6.19
6.20
6.21
6.22
6.23
6.24
6.25
C Quantitative Methods in Merger Analysis
6.26
6.27
6.28
6.29
6.30
6.31
6.32
6.33
6.34
6.35
6.36
6.37
6.38
6.39
6.40
D Critical Loss Analysis
6.41
6.42
6.43
6.44
6.45
6.46
6.47
6.48
6.49
6.50
6.51
6.52
6.53
6.54
6.55
6.56
6.57
6.58
6.59
E Approaches to Market Definition
6.60
6.61
6.62
7 Horizontal Mergers—Non-Coordinated Effects
Preliminary Material
7.01
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
7.06
7.07
A Non-coordinated Effects of Horizontal Mergers
7.08
7.09
7.10
7.11
7.12
(1) Assessment of non-coordinated effects
7.13
7.14
7.15
7.16
7.17
7.18
7.19
(a) Market share and concentration levels
7.20
7.21
7.22
7.23
7.24
7.25
7.26
7.27
7.28
7.29
7.30
(b) Merging firms are close competitors
7.31
7.32
7.33
7.34
7.35
7.36
(c) Customers have limited possibilities of switching between suppliers
7.37
(d) Competitors are unlikely to increase supply if prices increase
7.38
7.39
(e) Merged entity is able to hinder expansion by competitors
7.40
(f) Merger eliminates an important competitive force
7.41
7.42
(2) Network markets
7.43
7.44
7.45
7.46
7.47
7.48
7.49
(3) Importance of the assessment factors
7.50
7.51
7.52
7.53
7.54
B Horizontal Mergers Leading to Non-coordinated Effects in Oligopolistic Markets
7.55
7.56
7.57
7.58
7.59
7.60
7.61
7.62
7.63
7.64
7.65
7.66
7.67
7.68
(1) Oracle/PeopleSoft
7.69
7.70
7.71
7.72
7.73
7.74
7.75
7.76
7.77
7.78
7.79
(2) Syngenta CP/Advanta
7.80
7.81
7.82
7.83
7.84
(3) Johnson and Johnson/Guidant
7.85
7.86
7.87
7.88
7.89
7.90
7.91
7.92
7.93
(4) T-Mobile/Tele.ring
7.94
7.95
7.96
7.97
7.98
7.99
7.100
7.101
7.102
7.103
7.104
7.105
7.106
7.107
8 Horizontal Mergers—Coordinated Effects
Preliminary Material
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
8.06
8.07
8.08
8.09
8.10
A Background of Collective Dominance and Coordinated Effects
8.11
8.12
8.13
8.14
8.15
8.16
8.17
8.18
8.19
8.20
8.21
8.22
B Development of Assessment Criteria
8.23
a
b
c
d
8.24
8.25
8.26
8.27
8.28
(1) Degree of concentration
8.29
8.30
8.31
8.32
8.33
8.34
8.35
8.36
8.37
8.38
(2) Barriers to entry
8.39
8.40
8.41
(3) Product homogeneity
8.42
8.43
8.44
8.45
8.46
(4) Price elasticity
8.47
8.48
(5) Symmetric market conditions
8.49
8.50
8.51
8.52
8.53
(6) Market stability and technologically mature markets
8.54
8.55
8.56
8.57
8.58
8.59
8.60
8.61
(7) Past and current conduct of firms
8.62
(8) Vertical integration and multi-market contacts
8.63
8.64
(9) Links between firms
8.65
8.66
8.67
8.68
8.69
8.70
8.71
8.72
(10) Is there an assessment checklist?
8.73
8.74
8.75
8.76
8.77
8.78
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
8.79
8.80
8.81
8.82
8.83
C Nestlé/Perrier: The Development of the Criteria
8.84
8.85
8.86
8.87
8.88
8.89
D The Airtours Case
8.90
8.91
8.92
8.93
8.94
8.95
8.96
8.97
8.98
8.99
(1) Transparency
8.100
8.101
8.102
8.103
8.104
8.105
8.106
8.107
8.108
(2) Retaliatory mechanisms
8.109
8.110
8.111
8.112
(3) Competitors and customers
8.113
8.114
8.115
8.116
8.117
(4) Conclusion on Airtours
8.118
8.119
8.120
8.121
8.122
8.123
8.124
8.125
E Sony/BMG – Impala
8.126
8.127
8.128
8.129
8.130
8.131
8.132
8.133
8.134
8.135
8.136
8.137
8.138
8.139
8.140
8.141
8.142
8.143
8.144
8.145
8.146
8.147
F Coordinated Effects of Mergers in Cartelized Industries
(1) Coordinated effects and past coordination
8.148
8.149
8.150
8.151
8.152
8.153
8.154
8.155
8.156
(2) Coordinated effects and contemporaneous coordination
8.157
8.158
8.159
8.160
8.161
8.162
8.163
8.164
8.165
(3) Criteria for assessing coordinated effects in a cartelized market
8.166
8.167
8.168
8.169
8.170
8.171
8.172
8.173
G Illegality of Future Conducts as a Deterrence of Anticompetitive Effects Arising from a Merger
8.174
8.175
(1) Article 102
8.176
8.177
8.178
8.179
8.180
8.181
8.182
8.183
8.184
8.185
8.186
8.187
(2) Article 101
8.188
8.189
8.190
8.191
i
ii
iii
iv
8.192
8.193
8.194
8.195
8.196
H Concluding Remarks
8.197
8.198
8.199
8.200
8.201
8.202
8.203
8.204
8.205
8.206
8.207
8.208
8.209
I Appendix
8.210
9 Non-Horizontal Mergers
Preliminary Material
9.01
9.02
A Pro-competitive Nature of Non-Horizontal Mergers
9.03
9.04
9.05
(1) Production efficiencies and cost savings
9.06
9.07
9.08
(2) Vertical externalities and exclusivity
9.09
9.10
9.11
(a)
(b)
(c)
9.12
(3) Transaction costs and the holdup problem
9.13
9.14
B Initial Era of Non-Horizontal Merger Assessment
9.15
9.16
9.17
9.18
9.19
9.20
9.21
9.22
9.23
9.24
9.25
9.26
9.27
9.28
9.29
9.30
9.31
C Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines
9.32
9.33
9.34
9.35
9.36
9.37
9.38
9.39
9.40
9.41
9.42
D Assessment of Vertical Mergers
9.43
(1) Non-coordinated effects: Foreclosure
9.44
(a) Input foreclosure
9.45
Ability for input foreclosure
9.46
9.47
9.48
9.49
Incentive to foreclose access to inputs
9.50
9.51
9.52
Impact on effective competition
9.53
9.54
9.55
9.56
(b) Customer foreclosure
9.57
Ability to foreclose access to downstream markets
9.58
9.59
9.60 Incentive to foreclose
Impact on effective competition
9.61
9.62
9.63
9.64
(2) Coordinated effects
9.65
9.66
9.67
(3) Two seminal cases
9.68
9.69
9.70
9.71
E Conglomerate Merger Assessment
9.72
9.73
(1) Non-coordinated effects
9.74
9.75
9.76
(a) Tying
9.77
(b) Bundling
9.78
9.79 Pure Bundling
9.80 Mixed bundling
9.81 Distinction between mixed bundling and pure bundling
9.82 Distinction between tying and bundling
(c) Portfolio theory
The extent of portfolio power
9.83
9.84
Sources of market power
9.85
9.86
9.87
9.88
9.89
9.90
9.91
9.92
9.93
Ability to foreclose
9.94
9.95
A significant degree of market power in one of the markets concerned
9.96
9.97
A large common pool of customers
9.98
9.99
9.100
9.101
9.102
9.103
(d) Incentive to foreclose
9.104
9.105
9.106
9.107
9.108
(e) Impact on consumers
9.109
9.110
(2) Coordinated effects of conglomerate mergers
9.111
9.112
9.113
9.114
9.115
9.116
9.117
10 Entry and Potential Competition
Preliminary Material
10.01
A Barriers to Entry
10.02
10.03
10.04
(1) Definition of entry barriers
10.05
10.06
10.07
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
10.08
10.09
10.10
10.11
10.12
10.13
(2) Committed v uncommitted entry
10.14
10.15
10.16
10.17
10.18
10.19
10.20
(3) Structural v strategic barriers to entry
10.21
10.22
10.23
10.24
10.25
10.26
(4) Entry in homogenous v differentiated markets
10.27
10.28
(5) Commission’s analysis of barriers to entry
10.29
10.30
10.31
10.32
10.33
10.34
10.35
10.36
10.37
10.38
10.39
10.40
10.41
10.42
10.43
10.44
(6) Assessment criteria for entry
10.45
(a) Likelihood of entry
10.46
10.47
10.48
(b) Timeliness of entry
10.49
(c) Sufficiency of entry
10.50
10.51
10.52
B Potential Competition
10.53
10.54
10.55
10.56
10.57
(1) Analysis of potential competition
10.58
10.59
10.60
10.61
10.62
10.63
10.64
10.65
10.66
10.67
10.68
(a) European Commission
Air Liquide/BOC
10.69
10.70
10.71
ENI/EDP/GDP
10.72
10.73
10.74
10.75
(b) UK Office of Fair Trading
NASDAQ/LSE
10.76
10.77
10.78
10.79
SvitzerWijsmuller A/S/Adsteam Marine Ltd.
10.80
10.81
10.82
10.83
10.84
10.85
10.86
10.87
11 Buyer Power
Preliminary Material
11.01
11.02
11.03
11.04
11.05
A Buyer Power: A Boon and a Menace
11.06
11.07
B A Boon: Countervailing Buyer Power
11.08
11.09
11.10
11.11
11.12
11.13
11.14
11.15
C A Menace: Buyer Market Power
11.16
11.17
11.18
11.19
11.20
D Some Specific Thoughts on Buyer Power
11.21
(1) Dependence
11.22
11.23
(2) Incentives
11.24
11.25
11.26
11.27
11.28
11.29
11.30
11.31
(3) Strength of bargaining/effort in negotiation
11.32
11.33
11.34
11.35
11.36
(4) Waterbed effect
11.37
11.38
11.39
11.40
11.41
(5) Information
11.42
11.43
11.44
E Market Definition and Buyer Power
11.45
11.46
11.47
11.48
11.49
11.50
11.51
11.52
11.53
11.54
11.55
F Measures to Assess Buyer Power
11.56
11.57
11.58
11.59
11.60
11.61
11.62
G Consequences of Buyer Power
11.63
11.64
11.65
11.66
11.67
11.68
11.69
11.70
11.71
11.72
11.73
11.74
H Assessment of Buyer Power by Competition Authorities
11.75
11.76
11.77
11.78
11.79
(1) Buyer power as a countervailing force
11.80
11.81
11.82
11.83
11.84
11.85
11.86
11.87
11.88
11.89
11.90
11.91
(2) Adverse impact of buyer power
11.92
11.93
11.94
11.95
11.96
11.97
11.98
11.99
11.100
11.101
11.102
11.103
I Concluding Remarks
11.104
11.105
12 Efficiency Assessment
Preliminary Material
A Types of Efficiencies
12.01
12.02
12.03
12.04
12.05
12.06
12.07
12.08
12.09
12.10
12.11
12.12
12.13
12.14
12.15
12.16
12.17
12.18
12.19
12.20
12.21
12.22
12.23
12.24
12.25
B European Commission Approach towards Efficiencies
12.26
12.27
12.28
12.29
12.30
12.31
12.32
12.33
12.34
12.35
12.36
12.37
12.38
12.39
12.40
12.41
12.42
12.43
12.44
C European Decision-making Practice
12.45
(1) Efficiencies in horizontal mergers
12.46
12.47
12.48
12.49
12.50
12.51
12.52
12.53
12.54
12.55
12.56
12.57
12.58
12.59
12.60
12.61
12.62
12.63
(2) Efficiencies in non-horizontal mergers
12.64
12.65
12.66
12.67
12.68
12.69
12.70
D Examples of Efficiency Assessment
12.71
12.72
12.73
12.74
i
ii
12.75
12.76
12.77
12.78
12.79
12.80
12.81
12.82
12.83
12.84
(1) Demand-side efficiencies as rivalry-enhancing efficiencies
12.85
12.86
12.87
(2) Demand-side efficiencies: product repositioning
12.88
(a) Demonstrability of efficiency claims based on post-merger product repositioning
12.89
12.90
12.91
12.92
(3) Supply-side efficiencies
12.93
12.94
E Seminal Case: Global/GCap
12.95
12.96
12.97
12.98
12.99
12.100
12.101
12.102
F Seminal Case: European Directories/Gouden Gids
12.103
12.104
12.105
12.106
12.107
G Concluding Remarks
12.108
12.109
12.110
12.111
12.112
13 Failing Firm Defence
Preliminary Material
A Failing firm defence
13.01
13.02
13.03
13.04
13.05
13.06
13.07
13.08
13.09
13.10
13.11
13.12
13.13
B The European Union Perspective
(1) Legislation
13.14
13.15
13.16
13.17
13.18
(2) Application of the failing firm defence
13.19
13.20
13.21
(a) Aerospatiale–Alenia/De Havilland
13.22
13.23
(b) Kali und Salz
13.24
13.25
13.26
13.27
13.28
13.29
13.30
13.31
13.32
13.33
13.34
13.35
13.36
13.37
13.38
13.39
(c) Saint Gobain
13.40
13.41
13.42
(d) Blokker/Toys R Us
13.43
13.44
(e) Boeing
13.45
13.46
13.47
13.48
13.49
(f) Bertelsmann
13.50
13.51
13.52
13.53
13.54
13.55
13.56
13.57
(g) Rewe/Meinl
13.58
13.59
13.60
(h) BASF
13.61
13.62
13.63
13.64
13.65
13.66
13.67
13.68
13.69
i
ii
iii
13.70
(i) The Arthur Andersen cases
13.71
13.72
13.73
a
b
c
d
e
13.74
13.75
(j) Newscorp
13.76
13.77
13.78
13.79
13.80
13.81
C Derogation: Removing the Suspension
13.82
13.83
13.84
13.85
13.86
13.87
13.88
13.89
13.90
(1) COMP/M.3156— EADS/Astrium (II)
13.91
13.92
(2) COMP/M.3209 WPP/CORDIANT
13.93
13.94
(3) COMP/M.4151— ORICA/DYNO
13.95
13.96
(4) IV/JV.3— BT/AIRTEL
13.97
13.98
(5) COMP/M.2777 Cinven Limited/Angel Street Holdings
13.99
13.100
(6) IV/M.722— Teneo/Merrill Lynch/Bankers Trust
13.101
13.102
13.103
13.104
D Reflections on Failing Firm Defence
13.105
13.106
13.107
13.108
13.109
13.110
13.111
13.112
13.113
13.114
13.115
13.116
13.117
13.118
13.119
13.120
13.121
13.122
13.123
13.124
13.125
E Concluding Remarks
13.126
13.127
13.128
13.129
13.130
13.131
13.132
13.133
13.134
14 Remedies
Preliminary Material
A Principles on Remedies
14.01
14.02
14.03
14.04
14.05
B Remedies and their Taxonomy
14.06
14.07
14.08
14.09
14.10
14.11
14.12
14.13
14.14
14.15
14.16
14.17
14.18
14.19
a
i
ii
iii
iv
b
c
i
ii
iii
d
14.20
C Structural Remedies
14.21
14.22
14.23
(1) Viable business
14.24
14.25
14.26
(2) Suitable purchaser
14.27
14.28
14.29
14.30
14.31
14.32
14.33
(3) Scope of divestiture
14.34
14.35
14.36
14.37
14.38
14.39
14.40
(4) Fix-it-first—up-front buyer
14.41
14.42
14.43
14.44
14.45
14.46
(5) Crown jewels
14.47
14.48
14.49
14.50
14.51
(6) Are structural remedies a panacea?
14.52
14.53
14.54
14.55
14.56
14.57
14.58
14.59
D Behavioural Remedies
14.60
14.61
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
i
j
14.62
14.63
14.64
14.65
14.66
14.67
14.68
14.69
E Quasi-structural Remedies
14.70
14.71
14.72
14.73
14.74
14.75
14.76
14.77
F Monitoring Commitments
14.78
14.79
14.80
14.81
14.82
14.83
14.84
G A Clear Choice on the Type of Remedies?
14.85
14.86
14.87
14.88
14.89
14.90
14.91
14.92
14.93
14.94
14.95
14.96
14.97
14.98
14.99
14.100
14.101
14.102
14.103
14.104
14.105
14.106
14.107
H Remedies in Periods of Crises
14.108
14.109
14.110
14.111
14.112
14.113
14.114
I Concluding Remarks
14.115
14.116
14.117
14.118
14.119
14.120
14.121
14.122
15 Judicial Review
Preliminary Material
15.01
15.02
15.03
15.04
15.05
15.06
15.07
15.08
15.09
A Locus Standi
15.10
15.11
15.12
15.13
15.14
15.15
15.16
15.17
B Standard Court Procedure
15.18
15.19
15.20
15.21
C Appeals in Merger Cases
15.22
15.23
15.24
15.25
15.26
D Expedited Procedure
15.27
15.28
15.29
15.30
15.31
15.32
E Interim Relief
15.33
15.34
15.35
15.36
F Consequences of a Successful Appeal
15.37
15.38
Further Material
Index
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Index
From:
EU Merger Control: A Legal and Economic Analysis
Ioannis Kokkoris, Howard Shelanski
Content type:
Book content
Product:
Oxford Competition Law [OCL]
Published in print:
01 January 2014
ISBN:
9780199644131
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