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EU Merger Control - A Legal and Economic Analysis by Kokkoris, Ioannis; Shelanski, Howard (1st January 2014)

7 Horizontal Mergers—Non-Coordinated Effects

From: EU Merger Control: A Legal and Economic Analysis

Ioannis Kokkoris, Howard Shelanski

From: Oxford Competition Law (http://oxcat.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved.date: 11 December 2019

Subject(s):
Merger control — Horizontal mergers — Coordinated effects — Economics — Oligopoly — Oligopoly, control of — Conglomerate effects
7.01 The emphasis of non-coordinated (or unilateral) effects analysis is not on market definition but on the elimination of the pre-merger competitive constraints that the incumbents imposed on each other. Unilateral effects arising from a merger are the same regardless of whether the merger generates high concentration within a narrow market, or causes the loss of close, direct competition between the merging parties within a broader market. 7.02 Assuming that every percentage point of market share in the market is an equal constraint on every other percentage...
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