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Economics for Competition Lawyers, 2nd Edition by Niels, Gunnar; Jenkins, Helen; Kavanagh, James (24th March 2016)

8 Design of Remedies

Gunnar Niels, Helen Jenkins, James Kavanagh

From: Economics for Competition Lawyers (2nd Edition)

Dr Gunnar Niels, Dr Helen Jenkins, James Kavanagh

From: Oxford Competition Law (http://oxcat.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved.date: 21 September 2019

Subject(s):
Fining Guidelines — Remedies in merger cases

This chapter discusses the design of remedies. Most of the literature on competition law focuses on the identification and analysis of competition problems, not on how to remedy them. The chapter covers structural and behavioural remedies. It sets out structural remedies in merger and conduct cases, drawing on regulatory insights on vertical separation. It then addresses behavioural remedies in merger and conduct cases and sets out the regulatory principles of access and price regulation. This includes discussions of the concept of fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) in intellectual property licensing cases, and of the lessons from behavioural economics, with the Microsoft and Google cases providing useful illustrations. The chapter also deals with the principles of setting fines (including the question of inability to pay fines), and with cost–benefit analysis, which can be applied to specific interventions and to competition regimes as a whole.

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