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Reporter(s)

Adriana Almășan

Uniunea Națională a Societăților de Asigurare și Reasigurare din România and ors, Final NCA decision, Decision No 63/2018, OCL 278 (RO 2018), 20th November 2018, Romania

From: Oxford Competition Law (http://oxcat.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. Subscriber: null; date: 01 March 2021

Parties:
Uniunea Națională a Societăților de Asigurare și Reasigurare din România, Allianz — Țiriac Asigurări SA, Asigurarea Românească — Asirom Vienna Insurance Group SA, Societatea de Asigurare-Reasigurare Astra Asigurări SA, Carpatica Asig SA, Euroins România Asigurare-Reasigurare SA, Generali România Asigurare Reasigurare SA, Groupama Asigurări SA, Omniasig Vienna Insurance Group SA, Uniqa Asigurări SA
Judges/Arbitrators:
Bogdan M Chirițoiu (President)
Procedural Stage:
Final NCA decision
Related Development(s):
National Union of the Insurance Companies v Romanian Competition Council, Case 2313/2/2019 (pending before the Bucharest Court of Appeal, application for annulment of the 63/20.11.2018 Decision of the Romanian Competition Council)Uniqua Asigurari SA v Romanian Competition Council, Case 2304/2/2019 (pending before the Bucharest Court of Appeal, application for annulment of the 63/20.11.2018 Decision of the Romanian Competition Council)Omniasig Vienna Insurance Group SA v Romanian Competition Council, Case 2343/2/2019 (pending before the Bucharest Court of Appeal, application for annulment of the 63/20.11.2018 Decision of the Romanian Competition Council)Allianz Ţiriac Asigurări SA v Romanian Competition Council Case 2377/2/2019 (pending before the Bucharest Court of Appeal, application for annulment of the 63/20.11.2018 Decision of the Romanian Competition Council)Generali România Asigurare Reasigurare SA v Romanian Competition Council Case 2371/2/2019 (pending before the Bucharest Court of Appeal, application for annulment of the 63/20.11.2018 Decision of the Romanian Competition Council)Societatea Asigurare — Reasigurare Astra SA v Romanian Competition Council, Case 2463/2/2019 (pending before the Bucharest Court of Appeal, application for annulment of the 63/20.11.2018 Decision of the Romanian Competition Council)Uniqa Asigurari SA v Romanian Competition Council, Judgement of the Bucharest Court of Appeal, Case 2510/2/2019 (rejecting the application for a temporary suspension of the 63/20.11.2018 Decision of the Romanian Competition Council)
Subject(s):
Concerted practices — Price-fixing — Fines
Core Issue(s):
Whether concerted practices, the object of which was increasing the sale price by means of direct contacts facilitated by a professional association, should have been considered as infringements of both national competition provisions Article 5(1) of the Competition Law and Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

Facts

F1  Allianz – Țiriac Asigurări SA (‘Allianz’), Asigurarea Românească — Asirom Vienna Insurance Group SA (‘Asirom’), Societatea de Asigurare-Reasigurare Astra Asigurări SA (‘Astra’), Carpatica Asig SA (‘Carpatica’), Euroins România Asigurare-Reasigurare SA (‘Euroins’), Generali România Asigurare Reasigurare SA (Generali), Groupama Asigurări SA (‘Groupama’), Omniasig Vienna Insurance Group SA (‘Omniasig’), and Uniqa Asigurări SA (‘Uniqa’) (together ‘insurance companies’) were members of the insurance professional association Uniunea Națională a Societăților de Asigurare și Reasigurare din România ‘(UNSAR’). [paragraph 107]

F2  According to the applicable regulations, the insurance companies were allowed to establish insurance premiums according to risk categories and policies. The conclusion of motor liability insurance policies was mandatory for car owners. Some insurance companies had a ‘low appetite for risk’, applying high insurance premiums—Allianz and Generali—and others had a ‘high appetite for risk’ and were ‘fighting for market shares’ and hence applied low insurance premiums—Euroins, Astra, Carpatica, and City Insurance. [paragraphs 36–39]

F3  The high level of claims in this market, as well as the insurance companies having a recourse action, required contact between competitors. [paragraph 127]

F4  The products on offer were homogenous and the only competitive element was the price. [paragraphs 67–69]

F5  During the investigated period of 2012–2016 there was an extensive exchange of information facilitated by UNSAR between the insurance companies, all of them UNSAR members, thereby engaging in concerted practices on motor liability insurance. [paragraphs 33, 106–7]

F6  Evidence collected (i) from an insurance company director and (ii) in the leniency procedure revealed that the discussions pertained also to debt collected between the insurance companies for motor liability in recourse actions. [paragraphs 121–2]

F7  The main bad debtors were Carpatica, Euroins, and Astra, which practiced dumping prices. Their creditors threated them with actions in court during some of the UNSAR meetings. In response to the argument that the cash-in did not cover the debts, the competitors/creditors suggested an increase in tariffs. The creditors pushed for a change in the business model practiced by the dumping tariff companies that had huge debts in recourse actions. During said meetings, the creditors also proposed a change in the norms applied by the regulator—some of them later implemented in legislation. One of the creditors said that they were not willing to sponsor the dumping prices of the bad debtors with their own money. [paragraph 124]

F8  A dawn raid at UNSAR revealed evidence including delegate lists and minutes from the meetings, and emails confirming the discussions between members on the need to increase tariffs. The talks on the increase of tariffs were confirmed by the Generali press release in 2013 announcing the increase in tariffs and the Allianz press release in February 2016 announcing increase in tariffs by 5–10% in March of that same year. [paragraph 112]

F9  Between 2011 and 2016, the medial premium increased for all categories of motor liability insurance. [467]

F10  In 2015, the Financial Supervisory Authority (‘ASF’), the national regulator of the domestic motor insurance markets, initiated talks to resolve the market problems which caused frequent interactions between competitors, in order to monitor the situations where some companies were not compliant. ASF took several measures in 2015 aimed at reducing the crisis induced by the insolvency of two operators and the withdrawal of the third one. Tariffs were increased by the rest of the operators in the market against the background of unpredictability of the damage claims. [paragraphs 49, 431–34]

F11  From 2015, the insurance premiums would remain the same, regardless of the distribution channel, so the broker could not direct a customer towards a certain insurance provider, by cutting from its own commission. Consequently, the customer would receive the same premium regardless of the offer, different brokers, or even the insurance operator itself. This limited competition between brokers and increased transparency. [paragraphs 59–60]

F12  In November 2016 the Romanian government enacted a limitation to the tariffs for motor liability insurance, applicable for six months, after which the premiums remained in place, even though they were freely established by the insurance companies. [paragraphs 471–75]

F13  Most of the policies were concluded by insurance brokers who compared offers from various operators using intranet platforms communicating with insurance providers via securitized communications protocols. These communication protocols were used by the insurance providers to obtain information from all of their competitors, by using their own resources, brokers, and external market research operators. [paragraphs 56–58]

F14  During the price war, motor liability premiums plunged, affecting profitability; hence the UNSAR members sought methods to improve financial situations. During UNSAR meetings some of the participants requested Euroins and Carpatica, the largest default debtors of recourse actions, to increase their tariffs. Euroins promised an increase of capital and/or increase in tariffs. New increases of 10–15% in tariffs were announced by UNSAR in 2013 and 2014. Generali also announced an increase in tariffs of 15–16%. Groupama announced during a UNSAR meeting that it reported to the regulator an increase of tariffs of 50%. An article in an online magazine revealed that Allianz prepared the increase by 5–10% of tariffs. City Insurance, which was not a member of UNSAR, was the first to increase the tariffs for motor liability insurance; the other insurance companies, members of UNSAR, followed with various increases in tariffs. The increase in tariffs was different by operator, ‘according to the appetite for risk of each, companies such as Euroins, Astra Carpatica and Asirom wanted a large percentage of policies in their portfolio, and practiced lower tariffs than Generali, Uniqa, Allianz, Groupama and Omniasig.’ [paragraphs 108, 112, 132, 146, 151, 153–54, 173]

Held

I.  Procedural Aspects

H1  Euroins applied for leniency. It was granted Type B leniency, resulting in a reduction of the fine. It made declarations in the appendix to the request for leniency, in two tiers. It also presented transcripts of audio records and documents, including emails. Euroins admitted the offence unequivocally and completely. [paragraphs 14–21, 464–66]

H2  The settlement procedure was applied to one of the undertakings (confidential) that admitted the competition law infringement. [paragraphs 22–27]

II.  Substantive Aspects

A.  Market Definition

H3  The relevant market was the market of motor liability insurance. [paragraph 32]

H4  An appreciable impact on trade between member states resulted from (i) the market being opened to European Union (‘EU’) operators (since 2017), (ii) the majority of the participants pertaining to groups active in many EU member states, (iii) the level of premiums in the market affecting international transportation services, and (iv) the participants holding collectively 80–97% of the motor liability insurance market. [paragraphs 616]

B.  Competitive Assessment

1.  Establishment of Market Power

H5  Between 2007–2014, UNSAR members represented 90% of the market, and in 2012–2014 its members were nine out of 11 motor liability insurance companies. In 2015, UNSAR members were eight out of the nine, and seven out of the eight in 2016. [paragraph 61] Between 2012 and 2015, Euroins held 18–22% of the market, Carpatica held 12–18% of the market, and Astra 16–15% of the market—together approximately half of the market. ABC withdrew from the market in 2015 and Astra and Carpatica had their licenses revoked in 2015 and 2016. Grawe Romania only started operations only in 2017, so at the end of the investigated period there were only eight insurance operators active in the market. [paragraphs 34–5]

H6  High entry barriers protected against collusion between new participants practicing lower prices than the ones already in this market. [paragraphs 47]

2.  Competitive consequences (pro & anti) of the Practice/ Conduct/ Agreement

H7  The recourse action of insurance operators against each other demonstrated willing cooperation between them. [paragraph 710]

H8  The claims for damages were not fully granted in courts; therefore, the profitability indicators were artificially increased in the short term. [paragraph 714]

H9  The insurance companies should establish tariffs in order to cover damage claims for the insured clients; hence each insurance operator should vary its tariffs according to the rest of the market, considering transparency. [paragraphs 414–15]

H10  The dumping prices practiced by some operators should be sanctioned and eliminated by the market regulator, and not be discussed between competitors. [paragraph 716] Furthermore, dumping prices could not be a sustainable argument for engaging in concerted practices. [720]

H11  UNSAR acted as a facilitator for the concerted practices by organizing meetings and, by making public the announcements regarding the increases in tariffs, played an active role in determining the raise in tariffs. UNSAR tried to conceal the discussions about raising tariffs by not including said topics in the minutes of the meeting. [paragraphs 450–51, 454, 459, 633–35]

H12  There was no need for further contact between competitors in order to collude prices, as the tariffs practiced in the market were perfectly transparent and easy to access by competitors. [paragraphs 184]

H13  Differentiation in action does not exclude collusion and decreased competition in the relevant market, given that none of the insurance companies distanced themselves from the measures or took action against them. The increase in tariffs would not have been made if the sanctioned companies were not certain about the general effect of the increase, a fact that profited each of them. [paragraphs 187–93]

H14  The monitoring of the market was not an infringement in itself. However, the monitoring concerned the actual tariffs, and not consumer satisfaction. Even the undertakings that did not have direct access to a broker platform—Uniqa, Allianz, and Generali—used the data on competitors to raise their own tariffs. [paragraphs 960–1]

3.  Conclusion

H15  The undertakings, members of UNSAR, infringed Article 5(1) of the Competition Law, Law No 21/1996; MO No 88/1996; MO No 153/2016, 10 April 1996, amended 2016 (Romania) and Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (9 May 2008) [2008] OJ C115/47, entered into force 1 December 2009 (‘TFEU’) by sharing sensitive commercial information about tariffs, including announcements on future increase of tariffs. [paragraphs 513–17]

H16  The undertakings held a series of meetings which they attended or for which they received the minutes. These meetings involved discussions on tariffs practiced by UNSAR members and led to the very increase in tariffs. [paragraph 548]

H17  The differentiated behaviour of the participants did not exclude concerted practices, taking into account the common objective of the companies that had coordinated their pricing policy. [paragraphs 584–89]

H18  The concerted practice of UNSAR members could not be exempted from sanctioning. [paragraphs 593] Article 101(3) of the TFEU was not applicable.

H19  The only way for the undertaking to be exonerated in the case of exchange of information was by public distancing, which did not occur. [paragraphs 108, 547]

H20  The undertakings were provided with elaborate information on their competitors and therefore monitored each other and the market. [paragraph 845]

H21  As regards the standard of proof, the explanations provided by the undertakings could not stand as the sole explanations possible. [paragraph 868]

H22  The counterfactual analysis of effects on competition could not be used for arguing against accusations pertaining to infringements by object. [paragraph 880]

D.  Remedy

  1. 1.  Allianz was fined the amount of 43,442,939 lei (approximately EURO 9,004,415.78);

  2. 2.  Asirom was fined the amount of 36,970,408 lei (approximately EURO 7,662,854.61);

  3. 3.  Astra Awas fined the amount of 22,037,026 lei (approximately EURO 4,567,613.27);

  4. 4.  Carpatica was fined the amount of 26,858,238 lei (approximately EURO 5,566,905.64);

  5. 5.  Euroins was fined the amount of 15,866,134.01 lei (approximately EURO 3,288,572.80). The fine was reduced to 6,346,453.6 lei (approximately EURO 1,315,545.29) as a result of the leniency procedure;

  6. 6.  Generali was fined the amount of 21,445,126 lei (approximately EURO 4,444,930.19);

  7. 7.  Groupama was fined the amount of 35,378,902 lei (approximately EURO 7,332,983.24);

  8. 8.  Omniasig was fined the amount of 40,529,090 lei (approximately EURO 8,400,462.44);

  9. 9.  Uniqa was fined the amount of 13,570,597 lei (approximately EURO 2,812,776.96);

  10. 10.  UNSAR was fined to the amount of 160,436 lei (approximately EURO 33,253.56). [pages 298–99, paragraph beginning ‘Art. 3.’]

H24  ASF should eliminate the regulations that require the same premiums regardless of the distribution channel.

Date of Report: 05 May 2020
Reporter(s):
Adriana Almășan

Analysis

A1  Decision 63/2018 (‘Decision’) raised the following issues:

  1. (i)  the conditions applicable to the contact between competitors in order to engage in concerted practices;

  2. (ii)  the role of a professional association, UNSAR, as facilitator of an infringement where communications between members are abundant due to the nature of the market; and

  3. (iii)  the differentiated behaviour of the undertakings involved in concerted practices and whether it precludes collusion.

A2  The Decision held that the infringement was based on the discussions that took place during UNSAR meetings; it omitted however to explain the nature of the discussions. The motor liability insurance market, in stark contrast with other insurance markets, generates legal relationships between competitors. In case of damage caused by the owner of an insured vehicle, the victim may file for claims directly with their own insurance company, hence transferring the recourse action against the motor liability insurer. The high level of claims in the market was noted in the Decision, but not fully discussed from the perspective of the implications and the tensions generated. The direct relationship between the competitors ought to be analysed in-depth in order to discern the unavoidable communications from the unnecessary illicit ones. The Decision failed to ascertain that a discussion between a creditor and a default debtor may be inevitable, instead concentrating on the illicit nature of the discussion on prices between competitors.

A3  The Decision held that UNSAR acted as a facilitator of the concerted practices by means of enabling circulation of information between its members during the meetings. Despite the fact that it acknowledged the abundant communications between competitors that was encouraged by the national market regulator ASF, the Decision overlooked the consequence of such encouragement and the difficulty of preserving the discussions within allowed parameters of information when tensions are generated by market circumstances.

A4  Moreover, the transparent nature of the market, enhanced by several measures taken by the national regulator ASF and the Romanian government, was not interpreted correctly in the Decision. In a transparent market, due to the abundant availability of information on prices from various sources—as noticed in the Decision—collusion is rendered unnecessary in order for the undertakings to adjust their price policy according to competition.

A5  The Decision was the epitome of erroneous application of competition rules, when oriented exclusively on the strict interpretation of the law and when completely detached from the economic context. The domestic motor insurance liability market was long divided into two categories: one category involved insurance companies that practiced dumping tariffs and failed to meet claims in case of insurance events; the other involved insurance companies that applied tariffs based on prudency rules and paid the claims. The data presented in the Decision revealed that Euroins, Carpatica, and Astra reached collectively 55% of the market during 2012–2015. Instead of being investigated for dumping practices, the three companies were qualified in the Decision as having ‘a high appetite for risk’ and ‘fighting for market shares’.

A6  The dumping practices and the constant failure in meeting the claims of the three insurance operators were notorious and caused the tensions in the market—also referred to as a price war—which intensified in 2015–2016 when two of them—Carpatica and Astra—eventually filed for bankruptcy and exited the market. The Romanian Competition Council (‘RCC’), instead of investigating the dumping practices earlier and accordingly sanctioning the insurance operators that increased their market share by infringing competition rules, ignored the real causes of the situation and applied Article 101 of the TFEU to all of the operators, including the ones that were compelled to increase tariffs, in order to compensate the losses from the failed claims against the bad debtors. The RCC not only intervened too late to remedy the cause, but also created a distortive effect to the market.

Date of Analysis: 05 May 2020
Analysis by: Adriana Almășan

Instruments cited in the full text of this decision:

Domestic

Competition Law, Law No 21/1996; MO No 88/1996; MO No 153/2016, 10 April 1996, amended 2016 (Romania)

Instructions regarding the conditions and the criteria applicable for the leniency policy (as amended), Official Gazette, Part I, No 610, 7 September 2009 (Romania)

Instructions on defining the relevant market, implemented by the Order of the Competition Council President No 388/2010, Official Gazette, Part I, No 553, 5 August 2010 (Romania)

Regulation regarding the contravention finding and the sanction application by the Competition Council, implemented by the Order of the Competition Council President No 668/2011 (as amended), Official Gazette, Part I, No 631, 5 September 2011 (Romania)

Decree no 301 for the appointment of the President of the Competition Council, Official Gazette, Part I, No 157, 5 March 2015 (Romania)

Regulation regarding the hearings in the Competition Council and taking decisions, implemented by the Order of the Competition Council President No 509/2015, Official Gazette, Part I, No 674, 4 September 2015 (Romania)

Instructions from 2016 regarding the sanction individualization for contravention provided by Article 55 from Competition Law No 21/1996 (as amended), Official Gazette, Part I, No 882, 3 November 2016 (Romania)

Decree no 17 for the appointment of a Vice president of the Competition Council, Official Gazette, Part I, No 61, 20 January 2017 (Romania)

Decree no 19 for the appointment of a member of the Plenary of the Competition Council, Official Gazette, Part I, No 61, 20 January 2017 (Romania)

Regulation of organization, functioning and procedure of the Competition Council, implemented by the Order of Competition Council President No 376/2017 (as amended), Official Gazette, Part I, No 601, 26 July 2017 (Romania)

Regulation for the procedure of Competition Council, implemented by the Order of the Competition Council President No 377/2017, Official Gazette, Part I, No 601, 26 July 2017 (Romania)

Decree no 472 for the appointment of a member of the Plenary of the Competition Council, Official Gazette, Part I, No 499, 18 June 2018 (Romania)

Cases cited in the full text of this decision:

General Court

Rhône-Poulenc SA v Commission of the European Communities, Judgment, appeal against penalty, action for annulment, Case T-1/89; [1991] ECR II-867; [1992] 4 CMLR 84, 24 October 1991

Chemie Linz AG v Commission of the European Communities, Judgment, application for annulment, Case T-15/89; [1992] ECR II-1275, 10 March 1992

Dansk Pelsdyravlerforening v Commission of the European Communities, Judgment, application for annulment, Case T-61/89; [1992] ERC II-1931, 2 July 1992

Vereniging van Samenwerkende Prijsregelende Organisaties in de Bouwnijverheid and ors v Commission of the European Communities, Judgment, action for annulment, Case T-29/92; [1995] ERC 289, 21 February 1995

Tréfileurope Sales SARL v Commission of the European Communities, Judgment, action for annulment, Case T-141/89; [1995] ECR II-791, 6 April 1995

Compagnie maritime belge transports SA and ors v Commission of the European Communities, Judgment, application for annulment, Joined cases T-24/93, T-25/93, T-26/93 and T-28/93; [1996] ECR II-1201, 8 October 1996

Stichting Certificatie Kraanverhuurbedrijf (SCK) and Federatie van Nederlandse Kraanbedrijven v Commission of the European Communities, Judgment, appeal against penalty, action for damages, action for annulment, Joined cases T-213/95 and T-18/96; [1997] ECR II-1739, 22 October 1997

Sarrió SA v Commission of the European Communities, Judgment, Case T-334/94; [1998] ECR II-1439, 14 May 1998

Buchmann GmbH v Commission of the European Communities, Judgment, Case T-295/94; [1998] ECR II-00813, 14 May 1998

Europa Carton AG v Commission of the European Communities, Judgment, Case T-304/94; [1998], ECR II-869, 14 May 1998

Thyssen Stahl AG v Commission of the European Communities, Judgment, action for annulment, Case T-141/9; [1999] ECR II-347, 11 March 1999

Irish Sugar plc v Commission of the European Communities, Judgment, Case T-228/9; [1999] ECR II-2969, 7 October 1999

Cimenteries CBR and ors v Commission of the European Communities, Judgment, action for annulment, appeal against penalty, Joined cases T-25/95, T-26/95, T-30/95, T-31/95, T-32/95, T-34/95, T-35/95, T-36/95, T-37/95, T-38/95, T-39/95, T-42/95, T-43/95, T-44/95, T-45/95, T-46/95, T-48/95, T-50/95, T-51/95, T-52/95, T-53/95, T-54/95, T-55/95, T-56/95, T-57/95, T-58/95, T-59/95, T-60/95, T-61/95, T-62/95, T-63/95, T-64/95, T-65/95, T-68/95, T-69/95, T-70/95, T-71/95, T-87/95, T-88/95, T-103/95 and T-104/95; [2000] ECR II-491, 15 March 2000

Bayer AG v Commission of the European Communities, Judgment, Case T-41/96; [2000] ECR II-3383, 26 October 2000

Tate & Lyle plc and ors v Commission of the European Communities, Judgment, Joined cases T-202/98, T-204/98 and T-207/98; [2001] ECR II-2035, 12 July 2001

Compagnie générale maritime and ors v Commission of the European Communities, Judgment, action for annulment, application for interim measures, Case T-86/95; [2002] ECR II-1011, 28 February 2002

Atlantic Container Line AB and ors v Commission of the European Communities, Judgment, action for annulment, Case T-395/94; [2002] ECR II-875, 28 February 2002

HFB Holding für Fernwärmetechnik Beteiligungsgesellschaft mbH & Co KG and ors v Commission of the European Communities, Judgment, Case T-9/99; [2002] ECR II-1487, 20 March 2002

Adriatica di Navigazione SpA v Commission of the European Communities, Judgment, appeal against penalty, action for annulment, Case T-61/99; [2003] ECR II-5349, 11 December 2003

Union Pigments AS v Commission of the European Communities, Judgment, Case T-62/02; [2005] ECR II-5057, 29 November 2005

AC-Treuhand AG v Commission of the European Communities, Judgment, action for annulment, Case T-99/04; [2008] ECR II-1501, 8 July 2008

BPB plc v Commission of the European Communities, Judgment, Case T-53/03; [2008] ECR II-01333, 8 July 2008

Mitsubishi Electric Corp v European Commission, Judgment, action for annulment, appeal against penalty, T-133/07; [2011] ECR II-4219, 12 July 2011

Aragonesas Industrias y Energía, SAU v European Commission, Judgment, action for annulment, appeal against penalty, Case T-348/08; [2011] ECR II-7583, 25 October 2011

Quinn Barlo Ltd and ors v European Commission, Judgment, actions for annulment, appeals against penalty, Case T-208/06; [2011] ECR II-7953, 30 November 2011

Trelleborg Industrie SAS and Trelleborg AB v European Commission, Judgment, action for annulment, Joined cases T-147/09 and T-148/09, 17 May 2013

Manuli Rubber Industries SpA v European Commission, Judgment, Case T-15409, 17 May 2013

AC-Treuhand AG v European Commission, Judgment, appeal against penalty, action for annulment, Case T-27/10, 6 February 2014

Reagens SpA v European Commission, Judgment, Case T-30/10, 14 May 2014

Court of Justice

Société Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH, Judgment, Case 56-65; [1966] ECR 235, 30 June 1966

Völk v S Établissements J Vervaecke sprl, Judgment, reference for a preliminary ruling, Case 5/69; [1979] ECR 295, 9 July 1969

Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd v Commission of the European Communities, Judgement, application for the annulment, Case 48-69; [1972] ECR 619, 14 July 1972

Frubo v Commission of the European Communities and Vereniging de Fruitunie, Judgment, reference for a preliminary ruling, Case C-71/74; [1975] ECR 563, 15 May 1975

Coöperatieve Vereniging ‘Suiker Unie’ UA and ors v Commission of the European Communities, Judgment, appeal against penalty, action for annulment, Joined cases 40 to 48, 50, 54 to 56, 111, 113, and 114-73; [1975] ECR 1663, 16 December 1975

Miller International Schallplatten GmbH v Commission of the European Communities, Judgment, Case 19/77; [1978] ECR 131, 1 February 1978

Heintz van Landewyck SARL and ors v Commission of the European Communities, Judgment, Joined Cases 209 to 215 and 218/78; [1980] ECR 3125, 29 October 1980

Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft AEG-Telefunken AG v Commission of the European Communities, Judgment, action for annulment, appeal against penalty, Case 107/82; [1983] ECR 3151, 25 October 1983

NV IAZ International Belgium and ors v Commission of the European Communities Judgment, Joined cases 96-102, 104, 105, 108 and 110/82; [1983] ECR 3369, 8 November 1983

Remia BV and ors v Commission of the European Communities, Judgment, action for annulment, Case 42/84; [1985] ECR 2545, 11 July 1985

Verband der Sachversicherer e.V. v Commission of the European Communities, Judgment, Case C-45/85; [1987] ECR 405, 27 January 1987

Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publications Ltd (ITP) v Commission of the European Communities, Judgment, action for annulment, Joined cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P; [1995] ECR I-743, 6 April 1995

Grundig v Commission of the EEC, Judgment, action for annulment, Joined Cases C-56/64, C-58/64; [1966] ECR 299, 13 July 1966

Société Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH, Judgment, Case 56-65; [1966] ECR 235, 30 June 1996

Javico International and Javico AG v Yves Saint Laurent Parfums SA (YSLP), Judgment, reference for a preliminary ruling, Case C-306/96; [1998] ECR I-1983, 28 April 1998

Bagnasco and ors v Banca Popolare di Novara soc coop arl (BNP) and Cassa di Risparmio di Genova e Imperia SpA (Carige), Judgment, Joined Cases C-215/96 and C-216/96; [1999] E ECR I-135, 21 January 1999

Hüls AG v Commission of the European Communities, Judgment, Case C-199/92 P; [1999] ECR I-04287, 8 July 1999

Commission of the European Communities v Anic Partecipazioni SpA, Judgment, action for annulment, appeal, Case C-49/92 P; [1999] ECR I-1425, 8 July 1999

Pavlov and ors v Stichting Pensioenfonds Medische Specialisten, Judgment, reference for a preliminary ruling, Case Joined cases C-180/98 to C-184/98; [2000] ECR 1-6451, 12 September 2000

Höfner & Elser v Macrotron, Judgment, reference for a preliminary ruling, Case C-41/90; [1991] ECR I-1979; [1993] 4 CMLR 306, 23 April 2001

Wouters and ors v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, Judgment, reference for a preliminary ruling, Case C-309/9; [2002] ECR I-1577, 19 February 2002

Aalborg Portland A/S and ors v Commission of the European Communities, Judgment, appeal against penalty, appeal, Joined cases C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P; [2004] ECR I-123, 7 January 2004

British Sugar plc v Commission of the European Communities, Judgment, appeal dismissed, Case C-359/01P; [2004] ECR I-4933, 29 April 2004

Dansk Rørindustri A/S and ors v Commission of the European Communities, Judgment, Joined cases C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P, and C-213/02 P; [2005] ECR I-5425, 28 June 2005

Sumitomo Metal Industries Ltd and Nippon Steel Corp v Commission of the European Communities, Judgment, action for annulment, appeal against penalty, appeal, Joined Cases C-403/04 P and C-405/04 P; [2007] ECR I-729, 25 January 2007

Competition Authority v Beef Industry Development Society Ltd and Barry Brothers (Carrigmore) Meats Ltd, Judgment, reference for a preliminary ruling, Case C-209/07; [2008] ECR I-8637, 20 November 2008

T-Mobile Netherlands and ors v Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit, Judgment, reference for a preliminary ruling, Case C-8/08; [2009] ECR I-4529; [2009] 5 CMLR 11, 4 June 2009

GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited (formerly GlaxoWellcome PLC) v Commission of the European Communities¸ Judgment, appeal, action for annulment, appeal, Joined cases C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P, and C-519/06 P; [2009] ECR 9291, 6 October 2009

Lafarge SA v European Commission, Judgment, appeal, appeal, action for annulment, Case C-413/08 P; [2010], ECR I-5361, 17 June 2010

Dole Food Company, Inc. and Dole Fresh Fruit Europe v European Commission, Judgment, appeal, action for annulment, appeal, Case C-286/13 P, 19 March 2015

AC-Treuhand AG v European Commission, Judgment, appeal dismissed, Case C-194/14 P, 22 October 2015

Infineon Technologies AG v European Commission, Judgment, Case C-99/17 P, 26 September 2018

Commission Decisions

Commission Decision relating to proceedings under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/400 — Agreements between manufacturers of glass containers), IFTRA-Glass Containers, 74/292/EEC; [1974] OJ L160/1; [1974] 2 CMLR D50, 15 May 1974

Commission Decision relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/30.174 — Vimpoltu), Vimpoltu, Case IV/30.174; 83/361/EEC; [1983] OJ L200/44; [1983] 3 CMLR 619, 13 July 1983

Commission Decision relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/30.350 — zinc producer group), Billiton Nederland BV and ors, Case IV/30.350; 84/405/EEC; [1984] OJ L220/27; [1985] 2 CMLR 108, 6 August 1984

Commission Decision relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, ANIC SpA Milan and ors (IV/31.149 — Polypropylene), Case IV/31.149; 86/398/EEC; [1986] OJ L230/1; [1988] 4 CMLR 347, 23 April 1986

Commission Decision relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/31.866, LdPE), Case IV/31.866; 89/191/EEC; [1989] OJ L74/21; [1990] 4 CMLR 382, 21 December 1988

Commission Decision relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the EC Treaty (Case COMP/F-2/36.693 - Volkswagen), Volkswagen, Case COMP/F-2/36.693; 2001/711/EC; [2001] OJ L262/14; [2001] 5 CMLR 1309, 29 June 2001

Commission decision of 2 July 2002 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement, (Case C.37.519 — Methionine), 2003/674/EC; [2003] OJ L255/1; [2004] 4 CMLR 20, 2 July 2002

Commission decision of 17 December 2002 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/C.37.671 - Food flavour enhancers), Case COMP/C.37.671; 2004/206/EC; [2004] OJ L75/1; [2004] 5 CMLR 11, 17 December 2002

Commission Decision relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the Treaty establishing the European Community and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/F/38.638 - Butadiene Rubber and Emulsion Styrene Butadiene Rubber), Bayer AG and ors, Case COMP/38638; [2008] OJ C7/11; COM(2006) 5007; [2009] 4 CMLR 421, 29 November 2006

Commission Decision relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/39.165 — Flat Glass), Case COMP/39165; [2008] OJ C127/9, 28 November 2007

Commission Decision relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the EC Treaty (Case COMP/39.188 — Bananas), Chiquita Brands International Incorporated and ors, Prohibition decision (Art.101 Ex 81), Case COMP/39188; C(2008) 5955 final; [2009] OJ C189/12; OCL 051 (EU 2008), 15 October 2008

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