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The Criminalization of European Cartel Enforcement - Theoretical, Legal, and Practical Challenges by Whelan, Peter (7th August 2014)

Conclusion, 11 Concluding Remarks on the Theoretical, Legal, and Practical Challenges of European Antitrust Criminalization

Peter Whelan Dr

From: The Criminalization of European Cartel Enforcement: Theoretical, Legal, and Practical Challenges

Peter Whelan

From: Oxford Competition Law (http://oxcat.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved.date: 11 December 2019

Subject(s):
Cartels — European Competition Network

This concluding chapter provides final remarks on the theoretical, legal, and practical challenges of European antitrust criminalization. It also determines five different research questions that should be addressed by future researchers. First, more detailed, reliable empirical evidence on the motivations of cartelists and whether or not they act in accordance with the rationality assumption of deterrence theory is required. Second, detailed qualitative and quantitative research concerning the usefulness of information exchange within the European Competition Network (ECN) would also be useful. Third, empirical evidence should be generated concerning whether consumers actually assume that their suppliers are not engaged in cartel activity with their competitors. Fourth, empirical studies on the extent to which risk aversion is a characteristic of corporate entities need to be pursued. Finally, empirical evidence on the cultural sensitivity of perceptions of cartel activity among the citizens of the different EU Member States would be welcome.

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