- Cartels — Fines for cartels — Application of EU competition rules
This chapter focuses on the criminal punishment theory of deterrence. A strong deterrence-based criminalization argument can be constructed concerning cartel activity: imprisonment helps, inter alia, to overcome the significant problems associated with optimally deterrent cartel fine. Arguably, then, deterrence theory can be relied upon as a foundation for antitrust criminalization. However, the deterrence-based criminalization argument is not as robust as some legal commentators would have one believe; in fact, it suffers from a number of potential limitations. Specifically, the case in favour of the employment of criminal antitrust sanctions to deter cartel activity is vulnerable to the extent that one can demonstrate that: (i) cartel activity is morally neutral conduct; (ii) undertakings are risk averse; (iii) undertakings/individuals do not act rationally; and (iv) personal criminal sanctions are incapable of generating more benefits than costs.
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full
to access all content.