- Cartels — Fines for cartels — Application of EU competition rules
This chapter presents two different criminal punishment theories which are potentially relevant to the European antitrust criminalization debate: deterrence and retribution. These theories were deemed to be of potential relevance for antitrust criminalization because: (i) the current literature on criminal cartel sanctions focuses to varying degrees on both of these theories; and (ii) the objectives of deterrence and retribution are currently pursued by the EU antitrust enforcers. Deterrence seeks to prevent future activity, either in a general (public-focused) or specific (individual-focused) sense. Meanwhile, retribution posits that individuals should face a criminal charge due to the fact that they have committed a moral wrong. The chapter then looks at the current status of the enforcement theories of deterrence and retribution in EU antitrust law.
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