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General Index

From: EU Competition Law and Economics

Damien Geradin, Dr Anne Layne-Farrar, Nicolas Petit

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From: Oxford Competition Law (http://oxcat.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Subscriber: null; date: 27 October 2020

(p. 543) General Index

above-cost pricing 4.284–4.293
absolute cost advantages 2.106
abuse of dominance 1.51, 1.80
annulment proceedings 5.224
exclusionary abuses 4.131, 4.132–4.370
exploitative abuses 4.131, 4.371–4.451
price discrimination 4.452–4.542
prohibition 1.49
see also dominance
accelerated/fast-track procedure 9.182
accessorium sequitur principale 3.148
accounting profits or economic profits 2.76–2.77
Act of State defence 6.88
actions for damages 3.208–3.214, 9.174–9.182
active sales restrictions 8.31, 8.56, 8.58–8.59, 8.103, 8.104, 8.107–8.111
actual competition 3.76
ad hoc regulations 1.159
administrative fines 6.79–6.88
basic amount determination 6.86
calculation method 6.84–6.85
increase of amount 6.87
reduction of amount 6.88
adverse selection problems 6.110
advertising investments 2.110
Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions 5.164–5.165
agency agreements 3.13–3.17
aggressive pricing 4.399
agreements 3.22–3.49
ancillary 6.26–6.27
anti-competitive 1.79, 1.160, 3.59
assessment principles 3.124–3.127
between non-competing undertakings 7.63, 7.107, 7.127
bilateral 1.181, 1.187
derogations 1.149–1.152
distribution 7.125
exclusivity 4.214
export, preventing competitive re-imports 3.156–3.159
infrastructure-sharing 1.160
intra-group 3.08–3.13
joint boycott 6.16
joint distribution 7.121–7.122
joint research and development 3.76, 3.122, 3.247
local 3.201
national 3.199
private coercion 3.26–3.28
public coercion 3.29–3.38
regional 3.199–3.201
subcontracting 7.78
transnational 3.196–3.197
unilateral actions 3.39–3.49
agricultural products sector 1.146–1.152
allocation principle 1.141
allocation of scarce resources 1.15–1.16
allocative efficiency 4.306–4.309, 4.312–4.313, 9.107
allocative inefficiency 1.22, 2.23
amicus curiae procedure 5.82–5.84
ancillary agreements 6.26–6.27
ancillary restraints doctrine 3.148–3.150, 7.88, 9.110–9.111
‘Ankara Agreement’ 1.187
annual reports (Commission) 1.111–1.112
annulment proceedings 5.210–5.220, 5.221–5.233, 5.234–5.242, 5.243–5.250, 5.251–5.287, 9.162–9.173
abuses 5.224
actions seeking compensation from EU institutions 5.246–5.250
actions seeking to obtain revision of fine 5.244–5.245
acts of a general nature 5.231–5.233
direct concern condition 5.222
EU act 5.211
formal conditions 5.234
individual applicants 5.221
individual concern condition 5.223
judicial review 9.167–9.173
restricted vs unlimited jurisdiction 5.252–5.254
standard (full) vs marginal (restrained) 5.255–2.287
legal effects, acts with 5.212–5.214
marginal review 9.162–9.166
privileged applicants 5.221
shareholders 5.226
substantive conditions 5.236–5.242
external legality 5.238–5.240
internal legality 5.238, 5.241–5.242
trade unions 5.225
anti-cartel policy 6.01–6.14
concept of cartel 6.01–6.03
economic clarification 6.05–6.06
empirical clarification 6.07–6.09
legal implications 6.11
political implications 6.12–6.14
stability 6.10
(p. 544) anti-competitive agreements 1.79, 1.160, 3.59
anti-competitive coordination 3.01–3.255, 7.04
exception rule 3.215–3.255
nullity rule 3.202–3.214
prohibition rule 3.04–3.301
anti-competitive effects, unilateral 9.42
anti-competitive foreclosure 4.142–4.146
buyer power 8.41
predation 4.299–4.301
vertical restraints 8.76, 8.92
anti-trust rules and authorities 4.346
appraisal, manifest error of 9.162–9.166
appreciability rule see de minimis doctrine
appreciable effects 3.128–3.140, 3.174, 3.176
arms industry sector 1.163–1.166
articles written by Commission officials 1.114
as efficient competitor test 4.147–4.149
associations of undertakings, decisions by 3.50–3.53
asymmetric information problems 7.54
Austria 5.34
authorization/notification system 1.53
‘autonomous’ concept 3.163
average avoidable costs (AAC) 2.146, 2.149–2.150, 4.147, 4.265, 4.296, 4.299
average costs 2.130–2.148
average avoidable costs (AAC) 2.146, 2.149–2.150, 4.147, 4.265, 4.296, 4.299
average incremental costs 2.151–2.152
average total costs (ATC) 2.130–2.135, 4.193, 4.266, 4.272
average variable costs (AVC) 2.143, 2.145, 2.149, 4.265, 4.272, 4.296
multi-product firms and allocation of common costs 2.134–2.135
strategic behaviours 2.136
variable costs 2.143–2.148
average incremental costs 2.151–2.152
average total costs (ATC) 2.130–2.135, 4.193, 4.266, 4.272
average variable costs (AVC) 2.143, 2.145, 2.149, 4.265, 4.272, 4.296
balancing test 3.227
barriers to entry 1.27, 2.16, 2.90–2.124, 4.67–4.68
characteristics 2.100–2.103
definition 2.93–2.99
exclusive contractual relationship 8.11
exploitative abuses 4.403, 4.421–4.423, 4.428
legal 4.68
natural 2.24
‘probable’ entry 2.102
product market 4.22
strategic barriers 2.118–2.124
‘sufficient’ competition 2.103
‘timely’ entry 2.101
barriers to exit 2.115
barriers to expansion 4.69–4.70
behavioural remedies 5.171
behavioural theories 2.61
‘behaviouralist’ movement see Chicago School
Belgium 1.49, 5.35, 6.106
benchmarking 4.396–4.403, 7.52
‘Better Regulation:
A Guide to Competition Screening’ 3.38
bid rigging 6.47
bilateral agreements 1.181, 1.187
black clauses see hardcore restrictions
block exemption 1.100, 3.219
decisions withdrawing benefit of 5.188–5.190
horizontal cooperation agreements 7.06, 7.08
production and specialization agreements 7.87
research and development agreements 7.64–7.66
vertical restrictions 8.70, 8.83–8.85
bonus schemes 4.178–4.180
bonuses 2.28, 4.488
border rebates 4.534
boycott agreements, joint 6.16
breakthrough of competition economics into EU law 2.04–2.05
‘briefing paper’ 9.142
‘but for’ see counterfactual analysis
buyer power (monopsony) 7.115, 8.38–8.44, 8.73–8.75
competitive harm theories 8.41–8.42
objective justifications and pro-competitive effects 8.43–8.44
Canada 6.90
candidate market 4.32
capacity constraints 4.204
cartels 1.04, 1.37, 1.51
collective dominance 4.79
continued operation after discovery 6.87
cross-border, market partioning 3.185, 3.196
lifespan 6.98
limitation 6.32–6.33
new industrial economics 2.51
overcharges 6.08
procedural framework 5.115
production limitation or control 6.30–6.31
prohibition 1.49
restrictions by ‘object’ 3.114
settlement procedure 1.101
trading conditions 6.28–6.29
ultra-liberalism 1.44
case law
decentralized enforcement system 1.126–1.127
decisional practice of the Commission 1.102–1.118
European Courts 1.119–1.125
categorization issues in judicial review 5.269–5.271
category captain 8.42, 8.44, 8.76
category management agreements 8.39, 8.42, 8.44, 8.76
(p. 545) cease and desist orders 5.170
‘cellophane fallacy’ 4.45–4.46
chains of substitution 4.28–4.30
chemical industry 6.92
Chicago School (‘behaviouralist’ movement) 1.65–1.66, 2.35, 2.42–2.47, 2.48–2.50, 2.53
barriers to entry 2.93
limited distribution 8.24
resale price maintenance 8.20
vertical restraints 8.54
circumstantial evidence, concordant 3.59
classical and neoclassical competition economics 2.10–2.34
monopolies and cartels 2.20–2.30
perfect competition 2.15–2.19
supply and demand 2.12–2.14
theories, evaluation of 2.31–2.34
coercion
condition/test 4.239–4.241
private 3.26–3.28
cointegration analysis 4.38
Colbertism 1.36
collective boycott strategies 6.50–6.52
collective dominance 9.61, 9.64, 9.67, 9.69
as cumulative effect of individual dominant positions in distinct markets 4.110–4.112
and legislative/regulatory measures 4.115–4.116
and oligopolistic anti-competitive coordination 4.81–4.108
Commission involvement 4.81–4.86
Commission low-enforcement practice 4.102–4.106
Courts’ involvement 4.87–4.91
merger control 4.92–4.96
Merger Regulation case law under Article 102 4.97–4.101
uncertain contours of notion of abuse 4.107–4.108
in oligopolistic settings 4.117–4.130
assessment of dominance 4.130
existence of collective entity 4.119–4.129
short of single economic entity doctrine 4.113–4.114
vertical 4.113
collective entity 4.119–4.129
College of Commissioners 5.164, 5.239
collusion 1.37
buyer power 8.41
Chicago School 2.46
commercialization agreements 7.130–7.133
exclusive contractual relationship 8.11–8.12
horizontal 2.46
horizontal price 8.19
information exchanges 7.25–7.26
market-sharing 8.36
production and specialization agreements 7.81
purchasing agreements 7.113
resale price maintenance 8.19
vertical 2.46, 8.90
commercial contract, imbalanced 3.78
commercialization agreements 7.120–7.135
between non-competing undertakings 7.127
collusion 7.130–7.133
economic benefits 7.134
individual analysis 7.129
joint distribution agreements 7.121–7.122
main competition concerns 7.124
market-share thresholds 7.128
relevant markets 7.123
restrictions of competition by object 7.125–7.126
commitments, binding 5.177–5.187
common agricultural policy (CAP) 1.146
common costs 4.267–4.271, 4.386
common interest doctrine 3.40
common law 1.37
common market 1.59
common transport policy 1.153
commonality of costs 7.81
Communications (Commission) 1.105–1.108
company documents 4.44
company size 9.188
comparative advantage 7.92
compatibility presumption 8.62–8.85
agreements of minor importance 8.63–8.68
block exemption 8.70, 8.83–8.85
conditions 8.79–8.82
double market-share thresholds 8.71–8.78
merger control 9.16
small and medium-sized enterprises 8.69
compensation, private actions for 6.90
compensation-seeking EU institutions 5.246–5.250
competence, lack of 5.239
Competition Commissioners 1.115–1.116, 5.239
competition on the merits notion 4.136
competition reduction and buyer power 8.41
competitive disadvantage
geographic price discrimination 4.530, 4.532, 4.536
price discrimination 4.477–4.479, 4.496, 4.499
competitive harm theories 8.89–8.95, 9.12–9.15
competitive harm theories
buyer power 8.41–8.42
exclusive contractual relationship 8.11–8.13
limited distribution 8.22–8.23
market-sharing 8.34–8.36
resale price maintenance (RPM) 8.19
competitive price-cutting 4.256
competitors benchmark 4.400–4.403
complainants, information received from 5.96–5.103
complaints, formal and informal 5.97–5.98
complementary test 9.132–9.137
complex economic matters 5.272–5.287
component suppliers selling to end-users, repairers, and independent service providers 8.61
concentration 9.06–9.140
ancillary restraints compatibility 9.110–9.111
competitive harm theories 9.12–9.15
conglomerate mergers 9.11, 9.15
definition 9.06–9.08
double test 9.41–9.44
(p. 546) full-function joint ventures
compatibility 9.112–9.140
horizontal mergers 9.09, 9.13, 9.45–9.74
non-horizontal mergers 9.75–9.90
notification 9.18–9.40
downward referral (German clause) 9.37
interventions 9.38
legitimate interests 9.38–9.39
mandatory 9.29–9.30, 9.31
sanction 9.32
turnover calculation 9.24–9.27
undertakings, identification of 9.22
upward referral (Dutch clause) 9.36
thresholds 9.48
vertical mergers 9.10, 9.14
concerted practice 3.54–3.65, 7.47, 9.61
concordant circumstantial evidence 3.59
concurrence of wills between several independent undertakings 3.07–3.69
agreements 3.22–3.49
associations of undertakings 3.50–3.53
concerted practice 3.54–3.65
plurality 3.07–3.19
conditional rebates 4.159–4.219
bonus schemes 4.178–4.180
case law of courts and decisional practice of Commission 4.212–4.219
double marginalization avoidance 4.196
economies of scale and fixed costs recovery 4.196
economies of scope and transactions costs reduction 4.196
effective price 4.189
effects-based approach of Guidance Paper 4.201–4.211
growth 4.161
hold-up prevention 4.196
incremental 4.190, 4.195
market-share 4.161
multi-product/bundled 4.161, 4.182, 4.197–4.200, 4.203–4.204, 4.221
price reduction 4.196
quantity 4.161
‘relevant range’ 4.189–4.190
retroactive/roll-back 4.161, 4.174, 4.179, 4.185–4.187, 4.190, 4.214
‘suction effect’ 4.200–4.201, 4.203, 4.211
supplementary services 4.196
volume/quantity 4.167, 4.169, 4.172, 4.174
conduct of employees 6.66–6.67
conglomerate mergers 9.11, 9.15, 9.85–9.90
consumer choice 1.63–1.65, 8.11
Consumer Liaison Office (CLO) 5.105
consumer welfare 1.69, 1.71
consumers, information received from 5.104–5.105
consumers and passing-on condition 3.239–3.244
contestable market theory 2.91
contractual framework doctrine 3.41
contractual imbalance situation 3.78
contractual obligations 5.72
convergence rule 3.167, 3.169
cooperation
commercialization agreements 7.120
refusal in investigation process 6.87
coordinated effects see tacit collusion
coordination
correlated benefits 1.141
cost(s)
advantages, absolute 2.106
benefit analysis 6.84
commonality 7.81
duplication 1.180
efficiencies 3.225
fully-allocated 4.268
incremental 4.271
investment 2.109
legal, award of 5.72
long-run average incremental cost (LRAIC) 2.152, 4.147, 4.199, 4.266, 4.269, 4.299
production 2.125–2.126, 4.387
standards and predation 4.263–4.266
stranded 2.153–2.154
switching 2.112, 4.204
transaction 1.180, 4.196
transport 4.26–4.27
Council of Ministers (the Council) 1.52
Council Regulations 1.99
counterfactual or ‘but for’ analysis 3.89–3.91, 3.95–3.96, 3.104, 3.123
countervailing buyer power 4.73–4.78, 8.94
Cournot competition 2.32
crisis cartels 6.37–6.43
critical loss test 4.35–4.36, 4.46–4.47
cross-deliveries in selective distribution networks 8.60
culture, protection of 9.39
cumulative activities 1.144
cumulative effects 3.141–3.147, 4.112
cumulative jurisdiction 3.167, 3.169
customer exclusivity 8.21, 8.31
damages
awards 5.72
litigation 9.176–9.181
damnum emergens 5.248
data
historic (age of data) 7.45–7.47
(p. 547) requirements 4.39–4.41
de minimis agreements above the threshold 3.135–3.137
de minimis agreements, unlawful 3.138–3.139
de minimis doctrine 8.63
de minimis Notice 3.145–3.146
de minimis principle 3.128–3.133, 3.140
deadweight loss 1.19, 1.22
decisional practice of the Commission 1.102–1.118
annual reports 1.111–1.112
articles written by Commission officials 1.114
decisions 1.103
expert reports and third parties studies 1.117
Guidelines, Notices and Communications 1.105–1.108
oral statements 1.115–1.116
papers (discussion paper, non-papers etc) 1.109–1.110
press releases 1.113
decisive influence 6.56–6.57
defects in the reasoning 5.280
‘defence’ and’offence’ in nullity rule 3.207
demand-side substitution in product market 4.15–4.18
derogations for agreements 1.149–1.152
deterrence multiplier 6.64
DG COMP 1.54, 1.109–1.110, 2.01
exclusionary abuses 4.139
exploitative abuses 4.437–4.438
infringements detection 5.94–5.95
institutional framework 5.15, 5.20, 5.22
resistance of competition law 2.03
direct concern condition 5.222
direct ‘smoking gun’ evidence 3.59
discretionary power 5.256
Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 1.110
disqualification rules 6.90
dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions agreement 6.49
distribution
agreements 7.125
networks (vertical restrictions) 6.17
distributional trade-off s 5.276
distributive inefficiency 1.23, 2.29
diverse activities 1.135
domestic market rule 6.44
dominance 4.04–4.130, 4.458
barriers to entry 4.67–4.68
barriers to expansion 4.69–4.70
countervailing buyer power 4.73–4.78
definition stemming from case law 4.50–4.54
market definition 4.05–4.47
‘cellophane fallacy’ 4.45–4.46
company documents 4.44
critical loss test 4.35–4.36, 4.46–4.47
data requirements 4.39–4.41
geographic market 4.24–4.30
hypothetical monopolist test 4.31–4.34, 4.46
product market 4.14–4.23
questionnaires and surveys 4.42–4.43
SSNIP test 4.46–4.47
statistical analysis 4.37–4.38
market position of undertaking under investigation and its competitors 4.60–4.66
single firm 4.98
substantial market power definition and assessment 4.55–4.58
technology markets 4.71–4.72
double marginalization avoidance 4.196
double market-share thresholds 3.140, 8.71–8.78
double test (concentration) 9.41–9.44
downstream exclusive dealing 4.154
downstream market
production and specialization agreements 7.84
refusal to supply and margin squeeze 4.303–4.304, 4.324–4.325, 4.341, 4.350
downward referral (German clause) 9.37
downward sloping curve of demand 2.13
dual pricing 3.101
due diligence 6.68
duplication costs 1.180
‘Dutch’ clause 9.36
duty to act in a certain way (competence liée) 5.257, 5.259
dynamic efficiency 4.306–4.309, 4.312–4.313
dynamic industries 4.423
dynamic inefficiency 2.25–2.27
econometric methods 4.40
economic activity, agreement involving 3.178–3.181
economic approach 1.60, 2.06–2.07, 3.195
economic benefits
commercialization agreements 7.134
purchasing agreements 7.116
economic concept 3.85–3.97
economic efficiency 1.66–1.68, 1.71
economic freedom 1.63–1.65
economic goals 1.61–1.72
consumer welfare 1.69
economic efficiency 1.66–1.68
economic freedom, plurality and consumer choice 1.63–1.65
fairness 1.62
economic links 4.90–4.91
economic rationale of European integration 1.29
economic unit doctrine 3.11
economies of scale 1.29, 2.107, 4.68
conditional rebates 4.196
exclusionary abuses 4.286
merger control 9.102
production and specialization agreements 7.92
economies of scope 2.108
conditional rebates 4.196
exclusionary abuses 4.154, 4.266
merger control 9.102
production and specialization agreements 7.92
EEA Agreement 1.187, 1.189–1.190
(p. 548) ‘effect on trade’ concept 3.162–3.194
agreement appreciably affects trade between Member States 3.194
agreement has ability to affect trade 3.182–3.188
agreement may have an influence on trade between Member States 3.189–3.193
‘autonomous’ concept 3.163
economic activity, agreement involving 3.178–3.181
exceptions 3.169
individual assessment—qualitative analysis 3.177
market integration 3.164
normative vs institutional jurisdiction 3.166–3.168
screening—quantitative presumptions 3.171–3.176
effectiveness principle 3.214
effects-based approach 1.60, 2.06
conditional rebates 4.201–4.211
exclusionary abuses 4.137–4.150
tying 4.236, 4.242
vertical restraint 8.06
efficiency
allocative 4.306–4.307, 9.107
economic 1.66–1.68, 1.71
managerial 9.102
and objective justifications in vertical restraints 8.96–8.99
predation 4.302
productive 9.107
qualitative 3.226
efficiency defence 9.95–9.109
conditions 9.106–9.109
controversy 9.96
criticism 9.103–9.104
model 9.101
principle 9.105
shortcoming 9.95
softening 9.97–9.100
typology 9.102
efficiency gains 3.248, 7.51–7.55
admissibility conditions 3.228–3.232
commercialization agreements 7.135
economies of scale or scope 9.102
managerial efficiencies 9.102
merger control 9.188
merger specific 9.108
production rationalization 9.102
production and specialization agreements 7.91–7.93, 7.95
purchasing agreements 7.118
purchasing savings 9.102
standardization agreements 7.162–7.164
synergies 9.102
technological progress 9.102
verifiable 9.109
efficiency offence 9.95
efficient competitor test 4.214
EFTA Agreement 1.187
Egypt 1.33
elimination of competition, absence of in purchasing agreements 7.119
employee conduct 6.66–6.67
employment contracts 3.18–3.19
enforcement
gap cases 4.430
policy viewpoint 1.75
public vs private 5.01, 5.02–5.06
rules 1.89
system, decentralized 1.126–1.127
targets 1.75
territoriality issues 1.181
environment, protection of 9.39
equilibrium price 2.18
equivalence principle 3.214
equivalent transactions in price discrimination 4.476–4.477, 4.479
erga omnes effect 3.203
error of law 5.258
essential facilities doctrine 4.316
essentiality 4.355–4.358
Euro-Mediterranean Agreements 1.187, 1.190
European Agreements 1.187, 1.190
European Commission 5.09–5.26
Chief Economist Team (CET) 5.19
College, Commissioner and Director General 5.24–5.26
definitive measures 5.25
Directorates and Units 5.16–5.18
empowerment procedure 5.25
ex officio detection of hardcore cartels 6.91–6.95
execution measures 5.25
general policy 5.12
Guidelines/Guidance Paper 5.11
legal service 5.20–5.23
missions 5.10–5.14
prioritization policy 5.12
provisional measures 5.25
Regulation or Directive proposals 5.13–5.14
Regulations 1.100–1.101
staff and budget 5.18
sub-delegation 5.25
supervisory mission (watchdog) 5.10
vertical relationship with national courts 5.76–5.86
European Commission and National Competition Authorities interplay within the European Competition Network 5.38–5.70
European Competition Network 5.62–5.70
applicable legal instruments 5.63–5.64
functions 5.65–5.69
recent developments 5.70
horizontal issues 5.50–5.61
case reallocation 5.52–5.54
exchange of case-related information 5.58–5.61
negative jurisdictional conflicts 5.56–5.57
(p. 549) well-placed NCAs 5.51
vertical issues 5.39–5.49
cooperation mechanisms 5.44
loyal cooperation duty 5.42–5.43
monitoring instruments 5.45–5.49
priority competence of the Commission 5.40–5.41
European Court of Justice (ECJ) 3.62, 5.207–5.209
European Courts case law 1.119–1.125
European integration goals 1.73–1.80
European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) 7.138
evidentiary perspective 1.76
exploitative abuses 4.131, 4.371–4.451
ex post empirical assessment of remedial policy 9.156
ex tunc effect 3.204
exception rule 3.215–3.255
enforcement system 3.220–3.221
indispensability condition 3.249–3.251
method 3.217
non-elimination of competition condition 3.252–3.255
passing-on condition 3.238–3.248
purpose 3.216
scope of application 3.218–3.219
welfare improvement condition 3.223–3.237
wording 3.215
exceptional circumstances test 4.339
excessive prices 4.372–4.438
comparison with United States law 4.433–4.436
competitors benchmark 4.400–4.403
cost measure 4.385–4.387
decisional practice of DG COMP 4.408–4.419
geographical benchmark 4.396–4.399
historical prices benchmark 4.393–4.395
limits to application of Article 82(a) 4.420–4.432
profit margin 4.388–4.391
remedy design 4.404–4.407
standards for assessment 4.377–4.381
exchanges of undertakings 7.28
exclusion powers 2.60
exclusionary abuses 4.131, 4.132–4.370
case law of courts and decisional practice of Commission 4.134–4.136
conditional rebates 4.159–4.219
exclusive dealing 4.151–4.158
form-based approach and effects-based approach 4.137–4.150
predation 4.254–4.302
refusal to supply and margin squeeze 4.303–4.370
exclusionary intent, evidence required 4.272–4.278
exclusive commercial arrangements 2.123
exclusive contractual relationship
competitive harm theories 8.11–8.13
objective justifications and pro-competitive effects 8.14–8.17
exclusive dealing 4.151–4.158
exclusive distribution (customer exclusivity) 8.21, 8.31
exclusive purchasing 4.152–4.158, 8.30
exclusive rights 4.423
exclusivity agreements 4.214
executive jurisdiction 1.172–1.176
investigative measures 1.173–1.174
executives, dismissal of 6.90
expert reports (for the Commission) 1.117
exploitation of suppliers through buyer power 7.112
exploitative abuses see excessive prices
export agreements which prevent competitive re-imports 3.156–3.159
export cartels 3.153–3.154, 3.155
external competition 3.255
fact-intensive cases 5.267–5.268
‘failing firm’ doctrine 9.91–9.94
fair share 1.69, 3.246
fairness 1.62
fast-track procedure 9.182
fidelity rebates 4.478, 4.480, 4.485, 4.490
fifteen per cent threshold 7.110
‘fighting ships’ 4.293, 4.496
file, access to 5.152–5.157
filtering 9.76
fines 6.14
actions seeking to obtain revision of 5.244–5.245
personal/individual 6.90
firm, theory of 2.140
first-mover advantage 2.95, 2.116
five per cent threshold 3.136, 3.174
fixed costs 2.137–2.142, 2.147–2.148, 4.264, 4.267, 4.296
exploitative abuses 4.385
price discrimination 4.471
recovery 4.196
follow-on private suits 6.90
‘for the public good’ 1.137
foreclosure 3.200
buyer power 8.42
downstream 9.83–9.84
exclusionary abuse 4.154–4.157, 4.184, 4.191, 4.216–4.217
exclusive contractual relationship 8.11
input 8.22
limited distribution 8.22
merger control 9.14–9.15, 9.78–9.81
purchasing agreements 7.114
of third parties in related markets 7.82
upstream 9.79, 9.82
vertical 4.303, 8.90
foreign direct investment (FDI) 1.08
foreign firms 1.08
(p. 550) forms-based approach 1.60, 3.195, 4.137–4.150, 4.236
France 1.38, 1.49, 1.52, 1.53, 2.01, 5.35, 6.106
Décret d’Allarde 1.38
Loi le Chapelier 1.38
merger control 9.162
social cost of monopoly 1.13
vertical restraints 8.49
franchising agreements 8.81
FRAND commitment/requirements 7.154–7.155, 7.157–7.158
free enterprise 3.79
free-rider problem 8.15–8.16, 8.99, 8.101
freedom of movement 3.37
freedom to act on the market, restriction of 3.79–3.84
‘Frequently Asked Questions’ 1.113
Fribourg School 1.43, 1.46
full-function joint ventures compatibility 9.112–9.140
comparative assessment of legal regimes 9.138–9.140
complementary test 9.132–9.137
concept of full function 9.122
definition of joint venture 9.113–9.120
material condition 9.123–9.126
standard test 9.129–9.131
time condition—lasting quality/stability 9.127–9.128
fully-allocated costs 4.268
future conduct, individualized data regarding 7.29–7.30
General Court (GC) 1.119–1.120, 1.125, 5.207–5.209, 5.213
geographic market 4.24–4.30, 7.84, 8.65
geographic price discrimination 4.472, 4.525–4.541
Article 102(c) 4.536–4.541
case law of courts and Commission decisions 4.526–4.535
competitive disadvantage 4.530, 4.532, 4.536
parallel trade 4.537, 4.539–4.540
secondary line injury 4.530
geographical market partitioning 6.44–6.45
geographical prices benchmark 4.396–4.399
‘German’ clause 9.37
global competition law 1.177–1.186
good faith disclosure 7.156
government failure 1.25–1.26
Greece 1.33
Green Papers 1.110
grey clauses 7.06
gross domestic product (GDP) 1.13
group rebates 2.121
Guidance Communication on exclusionary abuse 1.110
Guidelines (Commission) 1.105–1.108, 1.162
hardcore cartels deterrence 6.78–6.111
ex officio detection by Commission 6.91–6.95
investigative powers, increase in 6.95
leniency programme 6.96–6.111
perfect penalty in relation to optimal fine 6.89–6.90
third party information and detection 6.93–6.94
hardcore restrictions 3.120, 3.218–3.219, 7.06
online distribution 8.100, 8.106, 8.110
vertical restraints 8.48, 8.50
Harvard School (‘structuralist’ movement) 1.63, 2.35–2.41, 2.44–2.45, 2.48, 2.53, 2.93, 2.129
Hearing Officer (HO) 5.155, 5.160, 5.163–5.164
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 2.89, 9.47–9.51
historical background 1.32–1.60
modernization process 1.56–1.60
ordo-liberal school 1.44–1.48
origins 1.33–1.38
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community 1.49–1.55
United States 1.40–1.42
historical prices benchmark 4.393–4.395
hold-up 4.196, 7.148, 8.17
horizontal cooperation agreements 3.200, 3.74, 3.92, 3.172, 3.196, 3.218, 3.244, 5.65, 7.01–7.170
categories 7.11
commercialization 7.120–7.135
complex 7.12
concept 7.10
definition 7.01
different forms 7.02–7.03
effects on competition 7.03–7.04
Guidelines on Article 101(3) 7.168–7.170
information exchanges 7.22–7.58
interface with Regulation 139/2004 7.14–7.15
legal implication 7.05
nationalization of case law 7.166–7.167
origin of applicable texts 7.06–7.09
production and specialization 7.72–7.96
purchasing 7.97–7.119, 7.101
research and development 7.59–7.71
restriction of competition within meaning of Article 101(1) 7.17–7.20
restrictive agreement benefitting from exemption in Article 101(3) 7.21
sector-specific law 7.13
standardization agreements 7.136–7.165
horizontal jurisdictional issues 3.152–3.161
horizontal mergers assessment 9.09, 9.13, 9.45–9.74
ambiguity 9.45
coordinated effects (tacit collusion) 9.60–9.64
non-coordinated (unilateral) effects 9.52–9.59
individual dominant position 9.53–9.54
maverick elimination 9.56–9.58
multi-criteria analysis 9.59
unilateral effects in absence of dominant position 9.55
(p. 551) screening—market shares and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 9.47–9.51
soft law 9.46
horizontal price collusion 8.19
hybrid (quasi-structural) remedies 9.158–9.159
hypothetical monopolist test (HMT) 4.31–4.34, 4.45–4.46
impact of competition law on public and private decision-makers 1.03–1.08
public authorities 1.06–1.08
undertakings 1.03–1.05
imports and exports 3.196
in-kind bonuses 2.28
incompatibility presumption 8.48–8.61
active and passive sales in selective distribution networks 8.58–8.59
component suppliers selling to end-users, repairers and independent service providers 8.61
cross-deliveries in selective distribution networks 8.60
resale price maintenance (RPM) 8.50–8.54
territorial resale prohibitions 8.55–8.57
incompatibility test in merger control 9.98
incremental cost approach 4.271
incremental rebates 4.190, 4.195
independence 4.52–4.53
independent experts 5.287
India 1.34
indispensability 3.249–3.251, 4.319
horizontal cooperation agreements 7.170
information exchanges 7.56
production and specialization agreements 7.94
purchasing agreements 7.117
standardization agreements 7.163
individual analysis
commercialization agreements 7.129
purchasing agreements 7.110–7.114
individual assessment—qualitative analysis 3.177
individual concern condition 5.223
individual dominant position 9.53–9.54
individualized data regarding future conduct 7.29–7.30
individualized information 7.42–7.44
individualized quantity commitments 4.214
individualized threshold 4.194
industrial raw materials industry 6.92
inefficiency
allocative 1.22, 2.23
distributive 1.23, 2.29
dynamic 2.25–2.27
internal/organizational 2.28
managerial 2.28
productive 2.24, 2.70
technical 2.28
information
asymmetric 7.54
imperfections 1.25
individualized 7.42–7.44
misleading 6.87
non-public 7.49
requests 5.124–5.129
strategic 7.40
information exchanges 7.22–7.58
anti-competitive foreclosure 7.25, 7.27
collusive outcome 7.25–7.26
efficiency gains 7.51–7.55
indispensability 7.56
non-elimination of competition 7.58
pass-on to consumers 7.57
possible pro-competitive effects 7.23
scenarios 7.22
infrastructure-sharing agreements 1.160
infringements, alleged, investigation of 5.123–5.140
information, requests for 5.124–5.129
inspections 5.130–5.137
power to take statements 5.138–5.140
infringements detection 5.91–5.122
complainants, information received from 5.96–5.103
consumers, information received from 5.104–5.105
DG COMP 5.94–5.95
leniency 5.115–5.122
market monitoring 5.92–5.93
sector inquiries 5.107–5.114
infringements, evaluation of 5.141–5.165
file, access to 5.152–5.157
formal proceedings 5.141–5.143
inter-service consultation 5.165
purpose 5.141
right to be heard 5.158–5.164
Statement of Objections 5.144–5.151
infringements, repeat 6.87
infringements of Treaty 5.241
injunctions 5.170–5.173
innovation 2.26–2.27, 7.61
inspections of alleged infringements 5.130–5.137
institutional aspects of cartel law 6.78–6.114
litigation 6.112–6.114
institutional negotiations 1.53
intangible goods 4.27
integrationist approach 3.98–3.112
‘integrationist’ effects 1.27–1.31
intellectual property (IP) 3.05
internationalization 1.185
merger control 9.79
refusal to supply and margin squeeze 4.309, 4.312, 4.320–4.321, 4.325–4.326, 4.328, 4.330–4.331, 4.334–4.335, 4.338
standardization agreements 7.139, 7.148–7.149, 7.155–7.158
inter-brand competition 3.05, 3.73–3.74
market-sharing 8.34
vertical restraints 8.02–8.03, 8.73, 8.90
(p. 552) inter-service consultation 5.165
interest to act condition 5.224
interim measures 5.72, 5.191–5.193
internal competition 3.75, 3.255
internal/organizational inefficiency 2.28
interpretative instruments 1.162
intra-brand competition 3.05, 3.73–3.74, 8.02, 8.34
intra-group agreements 3.08–3.13
introductory pricing 1.05
investigative measures 1.173–1.174
investigative powers, increase in for cartel detection 6.95
investment costs, high 2.109
investment limitation or control cartels 6.36–6.43
Ireland 5.34
irreversible costs see sunk costs
Italy 1.34, 1.49
joint boycott agreements 6.16
joint costs 4.267–4.271
joint distribution agreements 7.121–7.122
joint production phase 7.12
joint purchasing 7.97
joint research and development (R&D)
agreements 3.76, 3.122, 3.247
phase 7.12
joint selling 7.120
joint service contracts 6.28
joint ventures see full-function joint ventures
judicial review 5.255–2.287
annulment proceedings 9.167–9.173
categorization issues 5.269–5.271
complex economic matters 5.272–5.287
fact-intensive cases 5.267–5.268
marginal (restrained) review 5.256, 5.260
nature and intensity 1.122–1.125
procedural and substantive aspects 5.264–5.266
restricted vs unlimited jurisdiction 5.252–5.254
review targets 5.258
standard (full or normal) review 5.257, 5.260
jurisdiction
horizontal 3.152–3.161
normative vs institutional 3.166–3.168
prescriptive 1.167–1.171
languages 5.203
leader (ringleader) or instigator of infringement 6.87
learning by doing 4.286
legal certainty, loss of 1.60
legal costs, award of 5.72
legal exception system 1.53
leniency programme 6.13, 6.91, 6.96–6.111
assessment 6.106–6.110
‘first in the door’ 6.101–6.105
infringements detection 5.115–5.122
new detection tools 6.99–6.100
persistence 6.97–6.98
settlement procedure 6.111
Lerner index and semantics of cost 2.63–2.72
marginal cost, theoretical standard 2.65–2.69
marginal costs and non-manufacturing industries 2.71
productive inefficiency and high costs of monopolies 2.70
leveraging, off ensive and defensive 4.252
liberalization programmes 1.07
licences 1.36
limitation of competition between parties 7.80
limited distribution 8.21–8.28
competitive harm theories 8.22–8.23
objective justifications and pro-competitive effects 8.24–8.28
litigation 5.244–5.245
cartels and hardcore restrictions 6.112–6.114
features 1.120–1.121
second chance 6.113
local agreements 3.201
long-run average incremental cost (LRAIC) 2.152, 4.147, 4.199, 4.266, 4.269, 4.299
Louis XIV 1.36
loyalty discounts 2.121
loyalty/target/growth rebates 4.172, 4.174, 4.214–4.215, 4.491, 4.194
lucrum cessans 5.248
Luxembourg 1.49, 5.35
luxury goods 4.18
macro-economic effects 1.11–1.13
managerial efficiency 9.102
managerial inefficiency 2.28
marginal cost 2.127–2.129, 4.385, 4.471
and non-manufacturing industries 2.71
of production 2.18
theoretical standard 2.65–2.69
marginal review 9.162–9.166
market characteristics 3.248
market control or limitation cartels 6.32–6.33
market coverage 7.41–7.42
market failure theory 1.24–1.26
market, geographic 4.24–4.30, 7.84, 8.65
market integration 1.30, 3.164
market monitoring 5.92–5.93
market, neighbouring 7.84
market partitioning 6.18, 6.44–6.45, 7.80, 7.125, 8.35, 8.55
market performance 1.19
market position of undertaking under investigation and its competitors 4.60–4.66
market, potential/hypothetical 4.324
market power 2.05, 2.56–2.61, 3.124, 3.127, 4.458
market power measurement 2.62–2.82
Lerner index and semantics of cost 2.63–2.72
price comparisons 2.78–2.80
price-elasticity of residual demand 2.81–2.82
profits measurement 2.73–2.77
(p. 553) market power, substantial 4.55–4.58
market re-initialization rate 7.46
market share 2.84–2.87, 8.29–8.37
aggregate 3.172
competitive harm theories 8.34–8.36
horizontal cooperation agreements 7.20
horizontal mergers assessment 9.47–9.51
merger control 9.48
non-geographic 6.46
objective justifications and pro-competitive effects 8.37
rebates 4.161
thresholds 3.129, 3.131–3.132
commercialization agreements 7.128
production and specialization agreements 7.87
purchasing agreements 7.108–7.109
research and development agreements 7.64–7.66
single 8.72
tied 8.93
vertical restraint 8.68
market, spill-over 7.84
market structure 2.83–2.124, 3.248
barriers to entry 2.90–2.124
measurement 2.84–2.89
markets, technology 4.71–4.72, 7.61
markets, two-sided 4.257–4.258
Marshall Plan 1.48
material condition 9.123–9.126
maverick elimination 9.56–9.58
media plurality 9.38
meeting competition strategy 4.502
Member States, rules applying to 1.87–1.88
‘Memos’ 1.113
merger 1.160
conglomerate 9.11, 9.15, 9.85–9.90
merger control, institutional and procedural implementation 9.141–9.192
formal notification procedure 9.143–9.160
remedies 9.152–9.160
informal pre-notification procedure 9.141–9.142
merger control 4.92–4.96, 9.01–9.191
detection 9.73–9.74
economic reasons 9.03
history of development 9.02–9.05
jurisdictional issues 9.17
legal reasons 9.03
mutual understanding 9.73–9.74
problematic mergers 9.85–9.87
protest, lack of 9.73
retaliation 9.73
substantive issues 9.17
see also concentration
merger litigation 9.161–9.182
actions for damages 9.174–9.182
annulment proceedings 9.162–9.173
Merger Remedies Study 1.110
methodology of competition economics 2.55–2.154
average avoidable costs 2.149–2.150
average costs 2.130–2.148
average incremental costs 2.151–2.152
marginal cost 2.127–2.129
market power concept 2.56–2.61
market power measurement 2.62–2.82
market structure, indirect measurement of 2.83–2.124
production costs 2.125–2.126
stranded costs 2.153–2.154
micro-economic effects 1.14–1.26
market failure theory 1.24–1.26
neoclassical price theory 1.17–1.23
minimalist competition policy 2.45, 2.47
minimum efficient scale 4.154
misleading information provision 6.87
misuse of powers 5.242, 5.258, 9.191
mixed bundling see bundled rebates
mobile phones in Ireland 2.79
mobile telephony infrastructure sharing/national roaming 3.92–3.95
modernization process 1.56–1.60
monopolies
and competition 1.19–1.21
exploitative abuses 4.421–4.423
high costs 2.70
leveraging 4.223
merger control 9.13
profits measurement 2.73–2.74
social cost 1.13
monopolies and cartels 2.11, 2.20–2.30
allocative inefficiency 2.23
distributive inefficiency 2.29
dynamic inefficiency 2.25–2.27
innovation 2.26–2.27
internal/organizational inefficiency 2.28
managerial inefficiency 2.28
productive inefficiency 2.24
supply and demand imperfections 2.20–2.21
technical inefficiency 2.28
X inefficiency 2.28
moral hazard 8.77
multi-criteria analysis 9.59
multi-homing 4.239
multi-product firms and allocation of common costs 2.134–2.135
multi-product undertakings 4.266
multi-product/bundled rebates 4.161, 4.182, 4.197–4.200, 4.203–4.204
multiple agency 3.16
must-have brands (must-stock products) 4.204
national agreements 3.199
National Competition Authorities (NCAs) 1.95, 1.126–1.127, 3.166–3.169, 5.27–5.37
bifurcated judicial (adjudication) model 5.34–5.36
(p. 554) case law interpretation 5.31
core set of competences 5.30
effectiveness 5.28
horizontal cooperation agreements 7.166–7.167
and infringements 5.184, 5.190
integrated agency model 5.33, 5.36
limitation 5.32
procedural autonomy 5.29
national courts 3.166–3.169, 5.71–5.89
future case law 5.74
horizontal relationships 5.87–5.89
interests of acting before 5.72
past case law 5.73
vertical relationship with Commission 5.76–5.86
amicus curiae procedure 5.82–5.84
duty on Commission to transmit information to national courts 5.85–5.86
duty on Member States to forward written judgments to Commission 5.80–5.81
duty to avoid passing judgments contrary to Commission decisions 5.77–5.79
national preference 9.190
national solidarity 1.142
nationality 1.167
natural experiments 4.41
ne bis in idem principle 5.48, 5.185
Neal Report 2.40
necessity principle 7.170
negligence 6.88
neighbouring markets 7.84
nemo auditur propriam turpitudinem allegans rule 3.209
neoclassical competition economics see classical and neoclassical competition economics
neoclassical price theory 1.17–1.23, 2.94
decisive role of price 1.18
monopolies and competition 1.19–1.21
nepotism 2.28
Netherlands 1.49
network effects 2.113, 4.68
network industries sector 1.07, 1.158–1.162
new industrial economics (‘Post-Chicago’ School) 2.35, 2.48–2.54
new product 4.327, 4.331–4.335, 4.339
non-appreciable affectation of trade (NAAT) rule 3.172–3.173
non-compete obligations 8.80, 8.82
non-coordinated (unilateral) effects 9.52–9.59
non-elimination of competition 3.252–3.255, 7.96, 7.165
non-geographic market sharing 6.46
non-horizontal mergers 9.75–9.90
conglomerate mergers 9.85–9.90
efficiency defence 9.95–9.109
‘failing firm’ doctrine 9.91–9.94
filtering 9.76
vertical mergers 9.77–9.84
non-profit organizations 1.136
normative economics of competition 2.35–2.54
Chicago School (‘behaviouralist’ movement) 2.42–2.47
Harvard School (‘structuralist’ movement) 2.36–2.41
new industrial economics (‘Post-Chicago’ School) 2.48–2.54
normative vs institutional jurisdiction 3.166–3.168
North America 1.40–1.42, 1.43
Notice of 2008 9.156
Notice of Objections 6.111
notification
ex ante 9.18
procedure, mandatory 1.55
system 1.53
see also concentration
nullity rule 3.202–3.214
actions for damages amongst parties to unlawful agreement 3.208–3.214
‘defence’ and ‘offence’ 3.207
erga omnes effect 3.203
ex tunc effect 3.204
‘severability’ rule 3.205–3.206
objective justifications and pro-competitive effects
buyer power 8.43–8.44
exclusive contractual relationship 8.14–8.17
limited distribution 8.24–8.28
market-sharing 8.37
resale price maintenance (RPM) 8.20
objective necessity 4.302
obligation to supply 4.361, 4.365–4.366
obstruction in investigation process 6.87
Office of Fair Trading (OFT) 8.40
Selective Price Cuts and Fidelity Rebates 4.163–4.164
Official Journal (OJ) 1.105
oligopolistic anti-competitive coordination see collective dominance
oligopolistic settings see collective dominance
oligopoly 2.32, 4.101, 4.107, 9.70–9.71
gap 9.43
merger control 9.42
new industrial economics 2.49
problem 4.79
online distribution 8.56, 8.100–8.111
active and passive sales 8.103, 8.104, 8.107–8.111
selective distribution systems 8.100, 8.102, 8.104, 8.105–8.106
opportunism of governments 1.26
oral hearing 5.161–5.163
oral statements (Commission) 1.115–1.116
ordo-liberal school 1.43, 1.44–1.48, 1.49, 1.51, 3.79
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries 1.14, 2.93, 4.74, 6.09
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 1.20, 6.01
origins of competition law 1.33–1.38
(p. 555) origins of economics of competition law 2.02
output expansion 4.471
outsourcing 2.147
overinvestment in capacities 2.120
papers (Commission) 1.109–1.110
parallel conduct 3.65
parallel trade 3.101–3.112, 3.174, 6.19–6.20
geographic price discrimination 4.537, 4.539–4.540
market-sharing 8.33
parametrical competition 3.254
parental liability doctrine 6.54–6.65
decisive influence 6.56–6.57
deterrence multiplier 6.64
rebuttal presumption 6.58
single economic entity 6.55, 6.57, 6.59–6.62
parliamentary questions 1.118
participation, unrestricted 7.154–7.155
pass-on to consumers 7.57, 7.95, 7.118, 7.164
passing-on condition 3.238–3.248
assessment ex ante 3.248
consumers 3.239–3.244
extent 3.246
sliding scale 3.245
timing 3.247
passive sales restrictions 8.31, 8.58–8.59, 8.103, 8.104, 8.107–8.111
payment claims 5.72
penalties 5.174–5.176, 5.244
penetration pricing 4.399
perfect competition 2.11, 2.15–2.19, 2.33, 3.70–3.72
physical goods 4.25
plurality 1.63–1.65, 3.07–3.19
agency agreements 3.13–3.17
employment contracts 3.18–3.19
intra-group agreements 3.08–3.12
plus three rule (+3) 7.43
portfolio power/effect 9.88–9.90
positive economic effects 1.09–1.31
‘integrationist’ 1.27–1.31
macro-economic 1.11–1.13
micro-economic 1.14–1.26
positive externality 8.15
‘Post-Chicago’ School see new industrial economics
potential competition 3.76, 4.21–4.23
potential/hypothetical markets 4.324
power
discretionary 5.256
exclusion 2.60
misuse of 5.242, 5.258, 9.191
over price 4.56
selling 7.115
to exclude 4.57
to take statements 5.138–5.140
predation 4.254–4.302
above-cost pricing 4.284–4.293
anti-competitive foreclosure 4.299–4.301
concept 4.254
cost standards used for assessment 4.263–4.266
effects of 4.255–4.258
exclusionary intent, evidence required 4.272–4.278
financial 4.278
joint and common costs 4.267–4.271
objective necessity and efficiencies 4.302
recoupment 4.279–4.4.283
sacrifice 4.294–4.298
two-sided markets 4.257–4.258
premises, inspections of 5.131–5.134
prescriptive jurisdiction 1.167–1.171
press releases (Commission) 1.113
presumed restrictions:
restriction by ‘object’ 3.114–3.121
price(s)/pricing:
above-cost 4.284–4.293
aggressive 4.399
benchmark, geographical 4.396–4.399