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Contents
- Preliminary Material
- Main Text
- 1 Introduction
- Preliminary Material
- I The Ubiquity of EU Competition Law
- 1.01
- 1.02
- A Impact of EU Competition Law on Public and Private Decision-Makers
- B The Positive Economic Effects of EU Competition Policy
- Illustration: the Volkswagen case
- II The History of EU Competition Law
- III The Goals of EU Competition Law
- IV The Sources of EU Competition Law
- V The Scope of Application of EU Competition Law
- A Scope Ratione Personae—To Whom Does EU Competition Law Apply?
- B Scope Ratione Materiae—To What Sectors Does Competition Law Apply?
- C Scope Ratione Loci—Where is EU Competition Law Applied and Enforced?
- Illustration: the Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas case
- 2 Elements of Competition Law Economics
- Preliminary Material
- I Introduction
- II Epistemology of Competition Economics
- III Methodology of Competition Economics
- 2.55
- A The Concept of Market Power
- Illustration: behavioural theory of anticompetitive conduct—the Alcoa/Reynolds case
- B Measuring Market Power
- C Measuring Market Power, Indirectly
- 2.83
- (1) Structural measurement
- (2) Additional measurement tools—assessment of obstacles to entry and expansion
- D Other Useful Economic Concepts—Competition Law, Law of Costs
- 3 The Law and Economics of Anticompetitive Coordination
- Preliminary Material
- 3.01
- 3.02
- 3.03
- I Article 101(1) TFEU—The Prohibition Rule
- 3.04
- 3.05
- 3.06
- A The Legal Component of Article 101(1) TFEU—A Concurrence of Wills between Several Independent Undertakings
- Illustration: Viho v Commission
- B The Economic Component of Article 101(1) TFEU—A Restriction of Competition
- (1) The concept of competition
- (2) Substantive content of the concept of a ‘restriction of competition’
- (3) Presumed restrictions of competition vs Proven restrictions of competition—the object and effect dichotomy
- (4) The ancillary restraints doctrine
- C The Jurisdictional Component of Article 101(1) TFEU—A Restriction ‘Within the Internal Market’ Which ‘Affects Trade between Member States’
- 3.151
- (1) Horizontal jurisdictional issues
- (2) Vertical jurisdictional issues
- (a) The ‘effect on trade’ concept—purpose
- (b) The ‘effect on trade’ concept—interpretation
- 3.170
- (i) Screening—quantitative presumptions
- (ii) Individual assessment—qualitative analysis
- (iii) The agreement involves an economic activity
- (iv) The agreement has the ability to affect trade
- (v) The agreement ‘may have an influence’ on trade between Member States
- Direct or indirect influence on trade
- (vi) The agreement ‘appreciably’ affects trade between Member States
- (c) Shortcuts for the appraisal of the effect on trade
- II Article 101(2) TFEU—The Rule of Nullity
- III Article 101(3) TFEU—The Exception Rule
- 4 Abuse of Dominance
- Preliminary Material
- I Introduction
- II Determining Dominance
- 4.04
- A Market Definition
- B Dominance
- 4.48
- (1) Introduction
- (2) The definition of dominance stemming from case law
- (3) The definition and assessment of ‘substantial market power’
- (4) Factors to be taken into account to determine the presence of dominance
- (5) Collective dominance
- 4.79
- 4.80
- (a) Collective dominance and oligopolistic anticompetitive coordination
- (i) The Commission’s initial attempts to craft a doctrine of oligopolistic dominance
- (ii) The Courts’ acceptance of the doctrine of collective dominance under Article 102 TFEU
- (iii) Clarifications in the field of merger control
- (iv) Exportability of the EU Merger Regulation case law to Article 102 TFEU?
- (v) The enduring low-enforcement practice of the Commission
- (vi) The uncertain contours of the notion of abuse of a collective dominant position
- (b) Other settings in which collective dominant positions can be identified
- (c) Collective dominance short of the single economic entity doctrine
- (d) Collective dominance and legislative/regulatory measures
- (e) The test for collective dominance in oligopolistic settings
- III The Notion of Abuse
- 4.131
- A Exclusionary Abuses
- 4.132
- (1) The concept of exclusionary abuse
- (2) The various forms of exclusionary abuses
- 4.151
- (a) Exclusive dealing
- (b) Conditional rebates
- (ii) Effects of conditional rebates
- (c) Tying
- (d) Predation
- (e) Refusal to supply and margin squeeze
- B Exploitative Abuses
- 4.371
- (1) Excessive prices
- (a) Introduction
- (b) Standards set by the European Courts’ case law and Member State courts for assessing excessive price
- (c) Practical difficulties of controlling excessive prices
- (d) Decisional practice of DG Competition
- (e) Limits to the application of Article 102(a) TFEU
- (g) Summary on excessive pricing
- (2) Unfair contractual terms and conditions
- C Price Discrimination
- (1) Introduction
- (2) Definition, conditions, and different forms of price discrimination
- (3) The scope of Article 102(c) TFEU
- (4) Analytical framework for examining price discrimination measures
- 4.481
- (a) Price discrimination in primary line injury settings
- (b) Price discrimination in secondary line injury settings
- 4.506
- (i) Main forms of secondary line price discrimination measures examined under Article 102(c)
- (ii) Secondary line injury price discrimination by non-vertically integrated operators
- (iii) Secondary line injury price discrimination by vertically integrated operators
- (iv) The choice of Article 102(c) as the legal basis for the secondary line injury cases
- (c) Geographic price discrimination and measures facilitating this form of discrimination
- (5) Conclusion
- 5 Enforcement, Institutions, and Procedure
- Preliminary Material
- I Introduction
- II The Institutional Framework
- 5.08
- A The Commission
- B The National Competition Authorities
- C Interplay of the Commission and NCAs within the ECN
- D The National Courts
- III The Procedural Framework
- 5.90
- A The Detection of Infringements
- B The Investigation of Alleged Infringements
- C The Evaluation of Infringements
- D The Decision
- E Final Remarks
- IV The Judicial Framework
- 5.204
- 5.205
- 5.206
- 5.207
- 5.208
- 5.209
- A Acts Subject to Annulment Proceedings
- B Persons that can Start Annulment Proceedings
- C Modalities of Annulment Proceedings
- D Parallel and Subsequent Actions to Annulment Proceedings
- E Scope and Intensity of Judicial Review in Annulment Proceedings
- 6 Cartels And Other Horizontal Hardcore Restrictions
- Preliminary Material
- I The EU Anti-Cartel Policy
- II Substantive Cartel Law
- A Substantive Scope of Application—What Agreements Constitute Hardcore Cartels?
- (1) Concept of a hardcore cartel
- (2) Types of hardcore cartels
- 6.21
- 6.22
- (a) Cartels related to price fixing or other trading conditions
- (b) Cartels limiting production, markets, technical development, or investments
- (c) Agreements entailing the sharing of markets or of sources of supply
- (d) Agreements applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions and entailing joint boycott
- B Personal Scope of Application—What Undertakings are Liable for Hardcore Cartels?
- C Temporal Scope of Application—Are There Time Limits for Pursuing a Hardcore Cartel?
- A Substantive Scope of Application—What Agreements Constitute Hardcore Cartels?
- III Institutional Aspects of Cartel Law
- 7 Horizontal Cooperation Agreements
- Preliminary Material
- I Introduction
- II The Law Applicable to Horizontal Cooperation Agreements
- III Principles of Competition Analysis Applicable to Horizontal Cooperation Agreements
- A Basic Principles of Competition Analysis of Horizontal Cooperation Agreements
- B Specific Principles for Competition Analysis (By Type of Cooperation)
- (1) Exchanges of information
- (a) Definition and scope
- (b) Assessment under Article 101(1) TFEU
- (c) Assessment under Article 101(3) TFEU
- (3) Research and development agreements
- (4) Production and specialization agreements
- (5) Purchasing agreements
- (6) Commercialization agreements
- (7) Standardization agreements
- (1) Exchanges of information
- C Conclusions
- 8 The Law And Economics Of Vertical Restraints
- Preliminary Material
- I Introduction
- II Types of Vertical Restraint
- III A Step-by-Step Method for the Self-Assessment of Vertical Restrictions
- 8.45
- 8.46
- A Screening of Vertical Restraints
- 8.47
- (1) The presumption of incompatibility
- (a) Preliminary remarks
- (b) Resale price maintenance
- (c) Territorial resale prohibitions
- (d) Restrictions on active and passive sales in selective distribution networks
- (e) Restrictions of cross-deliveries in selective distribution networks
- (f) Restrictions on component suppliers to sell to end-users, repairers, and independent service providers
- (2) The presumptions of compatibility
- B Full-Blown Competition Analysis of Vertical Restraints
- IV Online Distribution
- V Conclusions
- 9 Merger Control
- Preliminary Material
- I Introduction
- II Regulation 139/2004
- 9.16
- 9.17
- A Should the Concentration be Notified?
- B Is the Concentration Compatible with the Common Market?
- (1) The double test included in Regulation 139/2004
- (2) Assessment of horizontal mergers
- (3) The analysis of non-horizontal mergers
- (4) The assessment of the parties’ justifications
- (5) The analysis of the compatibility of ancillary restraints
- (6) The compatibility analysis of full-function joint ventures
- III The Institutional and Procedural Implementation of Merger Control
- 1 Introduction
- Further Material