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Contents
- Preliminary Material
- Main Text
- 1 Introduction
- 2 A Primer on Cartels
- Preliminary Material
- I Why do Competitors Cartelize?
- II How Do Cartels Work (And When are They Stable)?
- 2.62
- 2.63
- 2.64
- A Setting up a Cartel
- B When are Cartels Stable?
- 2.82
- (1) Detecting and deterring cheating
- (2) Dealing with external shocks
- (3) Competition law (antitrust) enforcement
- (4) Algorithmic pricing and collusion
- 3 The Regulatory and Institutional Framework of EU Cartel Law
- Preliminary Material
- I The Regulatory Framework Applying to the Enforcement of Competition Rules against Cartels
- 3.01
- A Article 101(1) TFEU—The Prohibition Rule
- B Article 101(2) TFEU—The Rule of Nullity
- C Article 101(3) TFEU—The Exception Rule
- D Congruence with Economic Analysis
- II The Institutional Framework Applying to the Enforcement of Competition Rules against Cartels
- 4 Cartel Detection
- Preliminary Material
- 4.01
- 4.02
- 4.03
- I Market Monitoring
- II Inspections
- III Leniency
- 5 Cartel Prosecution
- Preliminary Material
- 5.01
- I The Commission Investigation
- II Decision versus Settlement
- III Sanctions
- 5.82
- A Sanctioning Regime
- 5.83
- 5.84
- (1) Description of the current EU antitrust fining system
- (2) Designing appropriate sanctions and incentives
- 5.106
- (a) What is the optimal level of corporate fines?
- (b) What is the best way to compute fines?
- (c) Can compliance programmes contribute to the effective enforcement of EU competition law?
- 5.121
- (i) What is a compliance programme and how can it be made robust?
- (ii) Should companies that had a compliance programme at the time of the infringement be granted a reduction in the amount of the fine?
- (iii) Should companies that set up compliance programmes after the detection of an infringement be granted a reduction in the amount of the fine?
- (iv) Limits to the effectiveness of compliance programmes
- (d) Is the inability-to-pay (ITP) excuse granted too rarely?
- (e) Does the effective enforcement of EU competition law require the introduction of other sanctions than corporate fines?
- (3) Improving the predictability of the EU fining system
- (4) Concluding remarks on sanctions
- B Parental Liability
- IV Appeals
- 6 Civil Damages
- Preliminary Material
- I National Initiatives in the Absence of an EU Damages Framework
- 6.01
- A The Problem of Private Enforcement
- B The US as the ‘Gold’ Standard?
- C National Initiatives in the Absence of an EU Damages Framework
- 6.13
- 6.14
- 6.15
- 6.16
- 6.17
- (1) Austria
- (2) Belgium
- (3) Bulgaria
- (4) Croatia
- (5) Cyprus
- (6) Czech Republic
- (7) Denmark
- (8) Estonia
- (9) Finland
- (10) France
- (11) Germany
- (12) Greece
- (13) Hungary
- (14) Ireland
- (15) Italy
- (16) Latvia
- (17) Lithuania
- (18) Luxembourg
- (19) Malta
- (20) The Netherlands
- (21) Poland
- (22) Portugal
- (23) Romania
- (24) Slovakia
- (25) Slovenia
- (26) Spain
- (27) Sweden
- (28) United Kingdom (England and Wales)
- D Summing up State of Private Enforcement before the EU Damages Directive
- II The EU Damages Directive
- A Background to the Directive
- B The EU Damages Directive
- C Concluding Remarks
- III Damages and the Pass-on Defence
- 6.114
- 6.115
- A Why Calculate Damages?
- B An Economic Framework to Discuss Harm from Price Distortions
- C Methods to Compute Direct Damages
- D Pass-on Defence and Output Effect
- E Conclusions
- 7 The Value of Anti-Cartel Rules
- Further Material